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This dissertation examines the mechanisms and factors that influence the choice and 
application of innovation strategies by high-tech entrepreneurs. As the competitive 
advantage of high-tech startups mainly originates from its knowledge-related resources, 
that is, its social capital, intellectual property, and human capital. This dissertation 
elaborates on these three knowledge-related resources. In the first paper, Dr. Rothaermel 
and I posit that the less visible, informal knowledge networks of individuals are a relevant 
source of information that drives the formation of future alliances between firms. By 
employing social network theories, we tested how certain structural characteristics of an 
informal knowledge network, such as the extent to which information is diversified and the 
information processing capabilities of key individuals, are positively correlated with the 
formation of future alliances. The second paper discusses the influence of intellectual 
property on a startup. In this chapter, I explored the impact of a novel innovation on the 
probability of a successful exit, the likelihood of forming strategic alliances and how such 
alliances influence the exit activity, and the mode of exit along with its financial returns. 
The third paper addresses the heterogeneity of the performance of serial entrepreneurs by 
exploring the moderators of the relationship between entrepreneurial experience and firm 
performance. The results indicate that education positively moderates the relationship 
between entrepreneurial experience and venture performance through both the learning-






CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this research is technology and innovation strategies in the 
entrepreneurship context. This dissertation examines the mechanisms and factors that 
influence the choice and application of innovation strategies by high-tech entrepreneurs. 
The motivation for this inquiry is the desire to answer two broad questions:  How do 
technology- and innovation-related resources create value and contribute to the competitive 
advantage of a firm? And how can firms appropriate value from specific technology- and 
innovation-related resources, particularly in terms of commercialization and cooperation 
strategies that complement the available resources of the firm? The competitive advantage 
of high-tech startups mainly originates from its knowledge-related resources, that is, its 
social capital, intellectual property, and human capital.  This dissertation elaborates on 
these three knowledge-related resources in an attempt to answer the above two questions.   
A tenet of the relational view of a firm is that strategic alliances are often required to 
gain and sustain a competitive advantage, particularly in knowledge-intensive industries.  
Not only do firms frequently rely on their prior alliances when they search for information 
and resources, but they also exploit these relationships to seek and establish new alliances. 
Although this strategy holds true for existing firms, new ventures face a conundrum:  Since 
they generally do not posses prior alliances, how do they obtain information relevant for 
future alliance formation?  In the first chapter, therefore, I explore this question jointly with 




of individuals are a relevant source of information that drives the formation of future 
alliances between firms.   
By employing social network theories, we hypothesize that certain structural 
characteristics of an informal knowledge network such as the extent to which information 
is diversified and the information processing capabilities of key individuals are positively 
correlated with the formation of future alliances.  To empirically test these hypotheses, we 
selected 422 biotech startups founded between 2008 to 2014 from BioCentury. We use 
inventors’ patent co-inventing data to construct an individual-level ego knowledge network 
for each startup. In this knowledge network, startups not only hold information about their 
own scientists but also receive information flow from the direct and indirect ties of their 
scientists. Therefore, the ego knowledge network for each startup consists of its own 
scientists, its coinventors, and the co-inventors of its co-inventors. We used the bi-
component measurement in UCINET to count the number of knowledge blocks and the 
number of cutpoints for each ego network and tested how it was related to the probability 
of alliance formation. The results of the analysis show that the number of both the 
knowledge blocks and the cutpoints are positively associated with the probability of 
forming alliances.  
The second chapter discusses the influence of intellectual property on a startup. 
While the characteristics of an innovation have persistent effects on the commercialization 
activities and performance of a startup, we know very little about how novelty, one of the 
most important characteristics of innovation, affects the likelihood of a successful exit or 




influences the selection and application of entrepreneurial strategy and potential 
performance, I have assembled comprehensive data on over 400 healthcare startups to 
study this question and report my findings in the second chapter. I draw the data from 
multiple sources such as CrunchBase, USPTO, Patentsview, Linked-in, Bloomingberg, and 
Thomson SDC platinum. In addition, I use an improved measure of the novelty of 
innovation to objectively and quantitatively proxy the novelty of innovation for startups.   
The second chapter also explores the impact of a novel innovation on the probability 
of a successful exit, the likelihood of forming strategic alliances and how such alliances 
influence the exit activity, and the mode of exit along with its financial returns. The main 
findings are as follows:  (1) Startups with novel innovations are less likely to have a 
successful exit; (2) This negative effect of novelty is attributable in part to increased 
difficulty forming strategic alliances; and (3) for startups with novel innovations, the IPO 
is a more common exit mode than acquisition; and among startups that succeed in exiting 
by an IPO, those with novel innovations exit with higher valuation. The results of this 
chapter contribute to the entrepreneurship literature by providing evidence of how 
technology attributes may influence the application of commercialization strategies for 
high-tech startups and how the application of a particular commercialization strategy 
affects the performance of a firm.   
High-tech industries are home to a large number of serial entrepreneurs. Although 
the performance of serial entrepreneurs is, on average, better than that of novice 
entrepreneurs, it varies widely.  Chapter 3, therefore, addresses the heterogeneity of the 




between entrepreneurial experience and firm performance. Studies have investigated 
several factors that influence the expected performance of serial entrepreneurs. This study 
adds to the literature by examining the extent to which education, as an individual 
characteristic, is associated with the expected performance of serial entrepreneurs. 
Referring to experiential learning theory and Lazear’s occupational choice model, this 
dissertation theoretically analyzes the effect of education on entrepreneurial learningby-
doing and self-selection processes, the two major determiners of the performance of serial 
entrepreneurs. The study includes a sample of individuals with various backgrounds from 
NLS97 and an empirical test of the joint effect of education on entrepreneurial learning-
by-doing and self-selection. The results indicate that education positively moderates the 
relationship between entrepreneurial experience and venture performance through both the 
learning-by-doing process and the self-selection process. The results of this paper 
contribute to the literature on serial entrepreneurship and provides useful information for 
entrepreneurs when they are making reentry decisions.   
Although the three chapters that make up this dissertation cover three areas—a social 
network analysis, innovation and technology management, and entrepreneurship—they are 
motivated by the same question:  How can high-tech startups enhance their entrepreneurial 
performance? To address this question, I have drawn insights from diverse streams of 
research, including network theory, organizational theory, science economics, the 
technology market, entrepreneurship, learning-by-doing, and core strategy theories. The 
first chapter of this dissertation, employing a social network methodology, contributes to 




between novelty and the exit mode of startups, contributes to the literature on the 
technology market; and the last chapter, which examines the moderating effect of education 
on both the learning-by-doing effect and the selection effect, contributes to the literature 





CHAPTER 2. THE NETWORK OF KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS: 
HOW INFORMAL TIES SHAPE THE FORMAL ALLIANCES OF 
STARTUPS 
2.1 Introduction 
 The relational view of a firm (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer, Singh, and Hesterly 
2018) posits that the locus of competitive advantage is often not found within an individual 
firm but within its strategic partnerships. Critical knowledge, resources, and capabilities 
are frequently embedded in strategic alliances that span firm boundaries.  In high-tech 
industries, strategic alliance networks often constitute the locus of innovation (Baum, 
Cowan, and Jonard, 2010; Ahuja, 2000; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996).  As 
critical complements create value from innovation as well as status endorsements, strategic 
alliances are particularly important to high-tech startups (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999; 
Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 2000).  For example, the early success of the electric car 
manufacturer, Tesla, as a new entry in the automotive industry, was aided by early strategic 
alliances with top-notch partners such as Daimler, Toyota, and Panasonic (Hoang and 
Rothaermel, 2016). Not only did these alliances provide fungible resources for the 
fledgling startup such as cash and a top-notch production facility, more importantly, each 
of these alliances allowed Tesla to access unique resources and capabilites: cutting-edge 
automotive engieering from Daimler; world-leading capabilities in lean manufacturing 
from Toyota; and expertise in and large-scale production of high capacity lithium-ion 




Prior research has documented that firms tend to rely on their existing interfirm 
alliances to obtain information when searching for alliance partners (Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999).  Alliance formation tends to be more prevalent in knowledge-intensive industries 
(Hagedoorn, 1993) because high-tech firms are increasingly in need of access to a 
diversified pool of knowledge and as thus depend more heavily on knowledge flows among 
their strategic alliances (Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe, 2006). Although such 
received wisdom tends to hold for existing firms, new ventures face a conundrum: Since 
they generally do not possess prior alliances, how do they obtain information relevant for 
future alliance formation? As the market for alliances in knowledge-intensive industries is 
often crowded because of the flood of new entries ripe with information asymmetries, this 
question is particularly relevant for startups (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010). To overcome 
information asymmetry and identify the best possible matches available, startups need to 
effectively exchange information to form alliances. The question of what factors influence 
flows of information and subsequent alliance formation by startups is strategically 
important, yet it demands more attention by researchers. 
Evidence that can help answer this question is found in research showing that 
information flow between firms is facilitated by their existing networks of alliances.  Both 
the current alliances and third-party alliance ties of a firm tend to be useful predictors of 
future alliance formation (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). 
That is, an existing interfirm network is a strong predictor of future alliances because 
current interfirm alliances are an effective channel through which useful and reliable 
information for evaluating potential future alliances is transferred; imperfect information 
about a wide range of possible partners, however, increases search costs (Oxley, 1997; 




Other evidence can be found in recent work that has drawn attention to the role of 
interpersonal knowledge networks in innovation, although prior work has mainly focused 
on large existing firms (Nerkar and Paruchuri, 2005; Carnabuci and Operti, 2013; 
Grigoriou and Rothaermel, 2014). They have found that the structure of the interpersonal 
collaboration networks deep within firms such as the range and cohesion, influence not 
only the innovation production and adoption of individual inventors (Nerkar and Paruchuri, 
2005) but also the inter-organizational diffusion of knowledge and firm-level innovation 
(Reagans and McEvily, 2003; Singh, 2005; Grigoriou and Rothaermel, 2014). Not 
surprisingly, prior works have also found that the structure of the collaboration network 
influences organizational knowledge sourcing and knowledge generation (Liebeskind, 
Oliver, Zucker, and Brewer, 1996; Carnabuci and Operti, 2013).  
Taken together, the prior literature indicates the following: First, alliance formation 
depends on the embeddedness of firms, and is even more critical in high-tech industries. 
Second, informal interpersonal knowledge networks embedded deep within firms influence 
knowledge diffusion and generation. Building on these findings, we advance the baseline 
hypothesis that the structure of a startup’s informal interpersonal knowledge network 
affects the likelihood of its entrance into formal interfirm alliances.  In this sense, the less 
visible informal interpersonal network is a predictor of the observable formal interfirm 
network. This notion is important for understanding potential sources of firm-level 
competitive advantage (Peteraf, 1991; and Dyer et al. 2018). In particular, interpersonal 
informal knowledge networks are not only firm-specific but also not readily obervable by 
competitors, and thus are hard to imitate; all factors that can contribute to firm-level 
competititve advantage (Barney, 1991). 
We empirically test how the structural characteristics of a startup’s ego knowledge 




drawing a longitudinal sample of 422 biotech startups founded between 2008 to 2014 in 
the United States. To construct the interpersonal collaboration network, we use patent co-
inventing data and, in particular, measure the number of knowledge blocks and cutpoints 
in each ego network. In line with our conjecture, we find that both the amount of diversified 
information and information processing limitations of key individuals deep within a firm 
are positively related to the probability of alliance formation by startups.  
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
2.2.1 Knowledge Networks and Information Flow 
Social networks play a critical role in the information flow among firms (Gulati, 
1998).  This finding is especially true in knowledge-intensive industries, where information 
flows between startups and incumbent firms occur frequently (Baum et al. 2000; 
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). The biotech industry, for instance, is characterized by high 
rates of innovation and high levels of technological and competitive uncertainty (Reagans 
and McEvily, 2003; Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, and Brewer, 1996).  As a result, startups 
and incumbents find it difficult to effectively communicate information and to form 
alliances.  Moreover, the successful evaluation of external technology demands internal 
absorptive capacity, that is, the ability of a firm to assess and evaluate external knowledge 
as well as assimilate it (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Rapid technological change, however, 
frequently challenges the absorptive capacity of incumbents to assess the value of a new 
technology held by startups.  Therefore, old-line incumbents are often less well positioned 
to assess and evaluate the new knowledge generated by startups, which in turn, frequently 
draws on the latest scientific discoveries (Liebeskind et al., 1996). Second, because of high 
technological and market uncertainty in the biotech industry, startups often struggle to 




the appropriate complementary assets to commercialize the new technology (Pisano, 
1997).  In such a situation, an effective social network is an asset to the information 
collecting and screening activities of startups (Powell, 1990).  
Incumbents frequently rely on the social networks of prior alliances to source 
information and select future alliance partners (Gulati and Garguilo, 1999).  For biotech 
startups that frequently have no pre-existing formal interfirm alliances, we argue that the 
social network on which they rely in order to source information to form future alliances 
is the intra-firm network based on inter-personal connections between knowledge workers 
such as scientists.  In high-tech industries, the competitive advantage of firms is often based 
on their knowledge-related resources (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Grant, 1996), which 
nearly all corporate strategies for high-tech firms are either related to or under the influence 
of.  Knowledge resides in a set of key people deep within the firm (Nerkar and Paruchuri, 
2005) who, together with those with whom they interact and form social relationships, 
constitute the knowledge network of the focal firm (Phelps, Heidl, and Wadhwa, 2012).  
Because of the effectiveness of transferring tacit knowledge and reliable information, 
interpersonal networks play a critical role in the knowledge transfer process (Reagans and 
McEvily, 2003; Nerkar and Paruchuri, 2005). We posit that startups use information 
obtained from their informal interpersonal knowledge networks in their alliance formation 
decisions. Therefore, the interpersonal knowledge network is the social network through 
which startups collect information to evaluate potential partners that can help them 
commercialize their innovations. 
Because patenting is the dominant method of tracking innovation in the biotech 
industry (Arora and Gambardella, 1987; Powell et al. 1996), we use patent co-inventing 
events to construct interpersonal knowledge networks.  In reference to prior studies 




inventor, and each tie represents a patent co-inventing event. The ties between co-inventors 
are social relationships, the primary channels through which new scientific knowledge is 
exchanged (Liebeskind et al. 1996; Oliver and Liebeskind, 1998). At the same time, these 
types of social relationships are also effective in the acquisition and transfer of information 
to the market (Uzzi, 1997).  Because information passes through the social network, firms 
are informationally constrained by the patent co-inventing network in which they are 
embedded (Granovetter, 1985).  
Similar to the firm-level network, the interpersonal knowledge network performs two 
functions in the information flow: information gathering and information processing 
(Paruchuri, 2010; Ahuja, 2000; Leonard-Barton, 1995). Since an individual’s functions in 
gathering and processing information are influenced by his/her network position 
(Paruchuri, 2010), the information that passes through networks is influenced by the 
structural characteristics of the knowledge network. At an individual level, people acquire 
knowledge spillover from their direct and indirect ties, and from the knowledge spillover, 
actors receive information about not only the newest technology and innovations but also 
the potential market applications and commercialization conditions of the new technology.  
Since individuals are subject to cognitive limitations (Simon, 1956), the positions of the 
nodes in the network, or jointly, the structure of the ego knowledge network, impact the 
flow of information and influences what and how much information will be passed on and 
how the information will be received. Thus, the individual-level knowledge network 
among firms mirrors the neural network of the brain; therefore, it can be viewed as the 
“brain of the startup firm” (Gurney, 1997).  
For the inventors in each startup, the amount of information that they are able to 
collect is constrained by the total amount of diversified information in their ego knowledge 




block.  Because inventors in one knowledge block share not only a common knowledge 
base but also newly generated knowledge, they are internally coherent about their own 
information. Therefore, the total amount of diversified information in a knowledge network 
is determined by the number of knowledge blocks in the network.  Information diffusion 
among diverse knowledge blocks depends on a few key players that bridge the blocks.  In 
this paper, we explore two structural characteristics of networks that influence the 
formation of alliances via their effects on information flow among the knowledge 
networks: (1) the number of knowledge blocks and (2) the number of cutpoints. 
2.2.2 Knowledge Blocks and Alliance Formation  
The ego knowledge network of each focal firm consists of one or more knowledge 
blocks; and within each block, structural coherence is high, and among the blocks, it is low. 
Each knowledge block consists of a set of inventors who share a common knowledge base 
and work on solving a common set of problems (Paruchuri, 2010; Hansen, 1999). The 
inventors could be working on a series of research that follows one stream or different 
streams of one problem. They engage in extensive communication and cooperation, and 
any two of them are linked by multiple independent paths (Moody and White, 2003). For 
the coinventing knowledge network of the biotech industry investigated in this paper, each 
knowledge block represents a potential opportunity for alliance formation, for a knowledge 
block can hold the research pertaining to a new technology, a method of exploiting the 
innovation, or ways of commercializing/using it (Baum, Cowan, and Jonard, 2010).  
We define a knowledge block as a group of inventors characterized by structural 
coherence. Different knowledge blocks are linked by a few cutpoints, the removal of which 
disconnects the information flow among the blocks (Borgatti, 2006). Although both 




knowledge blocks used in this paper differ from cliques in that everybody in a clique needs 
to be directly connected while individuals in knowledge blocks can be loosely linked to 
others as long as the connections take place along  more than one path. The intuition behind 
this definition and measure is that scientists within a group, especially a large group, may 
work on a specific part of a joint project, but they may not have direct cooperation with all 
others in the same group.  
Figure 1 marks the seven knowledge blocks of the firm Actinobac Biomed, Inc., 
which illustrates the difference between knowledge blocks and cliques.  The large 
knowledge block in the top right of this figure, if measured by cliques, will be divided into 
two cliques from the middle, but the knowledge block measurement identifies them as one 
block. The inventors in this knowledge block, or two cliques, are researchers either from 
top Irish universities or scientists in several U.S. companies located in New Jersey. These 
inventors are linked through inventor number 6117632-1, Daniel Joseph O’Mahony, and 
inventor number 6703362-3, Imelda J. Lambkin. Both Drs. O’Mahony and Lambkin are 
Irish and started their careers in academia in America. Later on, both Drs. O’Mahony and 
Lambkin had successful careers at multiple U.S. biotech companies and served on the 
boards of several of them.  Dr. Lambkin is currently a venture capitalist. Many patents 
generated by this knowledge block have an inventor team consisting of both Irish and 
American researchers.  Even though not all of the inventors in this knowledge block have 
a direct connection with one another, it is predictable that they are knowledgeable about 





Figure 2.1- The knowledge network of Actinobac Biomed, Inc. with knowledge blocks 
marked. 
These knowledge blocks are linked by several cutpoints, through which information 
flows and blocks learn the existence of each other. Information about the various 
knowledge blocks that pass through the cutpoints is useful for reducing information 
asymmetry between startups and incumbents and facilitates the formation of alliances.  In 
the process of alliance formation, the major challenge for startups is to identify potential 
alliance partners and learn the alliance environment in order to evaluate the value of the 
opportunities associated with the various partners (Baum et al., 2010). To mitigate risk and 
reduce searching costs, startups mainly rely on information in their current knowledge 
network (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). The number of knowledge blocks is positively 
associated with the number of potential partners for startups, and the divergent information 
flowing from these blocks leads to a more comprehensive understanding of the alliance 
environment, which increases the probability of an alliance formation (Wang and 




associated with the potential opportunities for the alliance formation of a focal firm. Thus, 
this study hypothesizes the following: 
Hypothesis 1: The number of knowledge blocks in the interpersonal knowledge network of 
a startup is positively associated with the probability of alliance formation. 
 
2.2.3 Knowledge Cutpoints and Alliance Formation 
The cutpoints in this paper represent only a few key players through whom 
information among the different knowledge blocks can pass.  Cutpoints are similar to 
brokers (Burt, 1992), for both of them span structural holes. The difference between the 
two is that brokers emphasize the spanning effect of boundaries at an individual level (Burt, 
1992) while cutpoints focus on the bridging effect of blocks within the entire network 
(Borgatti, 2006).  An individual can be a broker through ties with people in multiple 
cliques.  At the same time, two cliques, especially large ones, might have many brokers 
who act as channels of information flow between them. When two cliques are linked by 
multiple co-inventing ties, they share a proportion of a common knowledge base, and they 
are informationally coherent; therefore, we consider them to belong to one knowledge 
block.  In this situation, no single broker has a significant influence on the information flow 
in the entire network as information flowing through other brokers will complement the 
needed information.  Unlike brokers, cutpoints represent only a few individuals (at most, 
two in this project) who bridge the blocks. They are key individuals who influence the 
information flow of the entire network.  In sum, all cutpoints might be brokers and only 
brokers who play a critical role in information flow to the entire network are cutpoints.  
The most widely used measure of brokerage is Burt’s (1992) network constraints 




2010) and betweenness centrality (e.g., Baum, Cowan, and Jonard, 2010; Paruchuri, 2010).  
These measures, however, are at the node level and focus on the relationship between the 
ego node and its alternatives.  In knowledge networks, several cliques may be bridged by 
multiple brokers. In this case, we would consider such cliques structurally coherent and 
representative of only one knowledge block because information may flow among cliques 
through several people with different perspectives and there is no information asymmetry. 
Also, the removal of any single broker, considered replaceable, would not hinder the 
information flow among the cliques. Cutpoints may be brokers, but not all brokers are 
cutpoints.  
Take Actinobac Biomed, Inc. as an example to illustrate the difference between 
cutpoints and other brokerage measures. We used all three measures to calculate the 
brokerage of inventors in the knowledge network of Actinobac Biomed, the results of 
which are shown in Table 1. The network constraint measurement identified six brokers, 
the betweenness centrality measurement identified seven brokers, and the biComponent 
measurement identified five cutpoints. Among these inventors, only two, 8053406-1 and 
4966999-2, were jointly identified as brokers by all three measures. Figure 2 depicts the 
knowledge network and the five cutpoints identified by the biComponent measurement. 
The deletion of the five cutpoints generates a network made up of isolated knowledge 





Figure 2.2 - The knowledge network of Actinobac Biomed, Inc. with cutpoints marked 
 





Table 2.1 - Comparison of Brokerage Measurements 
 





1 6117632-1 0.25 117 0 
2 6361938-3 1.13 0 0 
3 6703362-4 0.33 108 1 
4 6703362-5 0.49 0 0 
5 6703362-3 0.27 96 0 
6 6346613-2 0.49 0 0 
7 4741900-1 0.42 16 0 
8 5243540-4 0.49 0 0 
9 4966999-2 0.39 374 1 
10 6916789-3 1.13 0 0 
11 7166296-7 0.56 0 0 
12 7166296-6 0.56 0 0 
13 10048272-4 0.56 0 0 
14 10048272-3 0.56 0 0 
15 6768024-4 0.56 0 0 
16 7294497-1 0.35 198 1 
17 8053406-1 0.58 378 1 
18 8617542-3 0.56 0 0 
19 7144992-1 0.56 0 0 
20 8617542-4 0.56 0 0 
21 8617542-2 0.56 0 0 
22 5204098-2 0.35 6 0 
23 5204098-3 0.55 1 0 
24 7422755-1 0.35 6 0 
25 8747863-5 0.21 350 1 
26 8444996-5 0.77 0 0 
27 7666846-1 0.56 0 0 
28 8795680-3 0.56 0 0 
29 8795680-7 0.56 0 0 
30 5225331-7 0.56 0 0 
31 8821862-7 0.56 0 0 
32 8821862-6 0.56 0 0 
33 8906393-2 0.93 0 0 
34 8926986-4 0.65 0 0 
35 10053503-4 0.65 0 0 
36 9289421-4 0.93 0 0 
37 8541386-1 0.93 0 0 
38 9289421-2 0.93 0 0 
39 6555358-3 1.13 0 0 






Among all inventors, two of them, Dr. O’Mahony (6117632-1) and Dr. Lambkin 
(6703362-3), are identified as brokers by both network constraints and betweenness 
centrality, but not by our key player measure. There is no doubt that at the individual level, 
both have co-inventors from Ireland and New Jersey, and they themselves benefit from this 
diversified individual knowledge network. At the whole knowledge network level, 
however, the removal of any one of the two will not totally block the information flow 
within it, particularly as this knowledge block is made up of inventors with not only similar 
backgrounds but also likely ties that may not be shown in this patent co-inventing network. 
Such hidden ties, which will always accompany direct observable ties, increase the overall 
coherence of the network. Therefore, although the brokerage position of Dr. O’Mahony 
and Dr. Lambkin benefits them as inventors at the individual level, they are not the only 
key players strategically important to the information flow of the entire knowledge block.  
The information received by the inventors in a focal firm is screened out and passed 
on by cutpoints in the ego knowledge network. The information-processing processes of 
cutpoints directly affect how much, what type, and which aspect of the information flow 
to the inventors of the focal firm.  One factor that strongly influences the information 
processing of cutpoints is the number of knowledge blocks that a cutpoint bridges. When 
a cutpoint spans many knowledge blocks, its understanding of each knowledge block will 
be shallower than a specialist’s in one area.  In each knowledge area, some opportunities 
can be identified only by experts with a sufficient amount of specialized knowledge in that 
area, which cutpoints are less likely to have.  One example is a cutpoint who is a productive 




information, which greatly reduces their ability to identify relevant information, leading to 
low-quality information flows (Paruchuri, 2010). Compared to communication with 
shallow gatekeepers and star scientists, a cutpoint who specializes in a certain area and 
bridges a few knowledge blocks is more productive.  In a network, the information burden 
for each cutpoint declines as the number of cutpoints in that network declines.  Therefore, 
we predict that the number of cutpoints in a network could increase the quality of 
information flow in that network and therefore increase the probability of alliance 
formation.  
To illustrate the different information flow functions of cutpoints in networks with 
diverse structures, this study uses two sample knowledge networks: Boston Heart 
Diagnostic (BHD) (Figure 4) and Cardeas Pharma (CP) (Figure 5).  BHD is composed of 
43 inventors and 13 blocks and CP 53 inventors and 18 blocks. The sizes and the number 
of knowledge blocks in the networks are comparable, but BHD has six cutpoints while CP 
has only one. As shown in Figure 4, the inventor in the middle, the only cutpoint in the 
entire knowledge network, is responsible for all cross-block information communication.  
Compared to CP, BHD has six cutpoints more or less scattered around the network.  As 
each cutpoint in this network bridges a few knowledge blocks, we expect the information 






Figure 2.4 -  The knowledge network of Boston Heart Diagnostics       
 
Figure 2.5 - The knowledge network of Cardeas Pharma  
Hypothesis 2: The number of cutpoints in the interpersonal knowledge network of a startup 





2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy 
2.3.1 Sample 
This study draws a sample from the biotech industry for three reasons. For one, 
because the biotech industry is driven by innovation, the competitive advantage of most 
biotech companies originates in their basic R&D (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010). 
Therefore, as R&D-related information constitutes a considerable weight in the 
information collecting processes of biotech firms, knowledge-related resources are a core 
consideration when they devise their corporate strategies. Therefore, the individual 
knowledge network of a startup channels a large amount of information in the alliance 
formation process, and the biotech industry is an appropriate context within which 
researchers explore how individual informal ties influence formal alliance formation.  
Another reason why the biotech industry aptly illustrates this relationship is that the 
motivation for forming alliances is strong in this industry, especially for startups seeking 
complementarity with large incumbents (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Therefore, the 
number of alliances with the participation of startups is sufficient for the empirical study 
in this research.  In addition, because of effective IP protection, biotech firms routinely 
patent their innovations. Because of the considerable amount of patenting, the patent co-
inventing network effectively captures the interpersonal relationships of inventors.  
The biotech startups in the sample used in this study come from BioCentury, a data 
source that provides information and analysis on the formation, development, and 
sustainability of life science ventures worldwide. BioCentury integrates news from 
multiple media sources and provides both basic firm information and up-to-date financial 




dependent variable and the full alliance data starts in 2008, our sample is limited to startups 
founded between 2008 and 2014.  Our observation starts with the birth of a startup ends in 
mid-2018. Because the knowledge flow through ties that link two nodes geographically 
distant differs from that of ties that link two nearby nodes (Singh, 2005), limiting the 
analysis to a single country ensures that the knowledge flow through all co-inventing ties 
is comparable. As the United States is the major biotech market in the world, hosting 
around 70% of all biotech companies, we focus our analysis on U.S. biotech startups. After 
screening out several biotech startups that do not have patents, our sample had 422 biotech 
startups, covering at least 80% of the biotech startups in America.1   
We chose to use domestic patents issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 
and all of the patent data used in this project, provided by Patentsview, were disambiguated.  
Patentsview generated the disambiguated assignee and inventor data by using a Bayesian 
supervised learning approach, the algorithms of which were jointly provided by the Fung 
Institute of Engineering Leadership and the Harvard Business School. In this dataset, each 
assignee and inventor was assigned a unique identification (ID) that could be used to track 
all patents related to that assignee and inventor.  To assemble the patent data, we first 
acquired the unique assignee ID for each startup in our sample. We obtained around 60% 
of the assignee IDs by direct merging and the remaining 40% by manually checking 
keywords and double checking them by location.  Using the unique assignee ID, we pooled 
all patents belonging to each startup and generated a host of unique inventor IDs for each 
startup, all of which was used in the construction of a knowledge network. 
2.3.2 Construction of the Knowledge Network  
                                                 
1 We checked the number of startups in some other leading pharmaceutical and biotech databases such 
as Pharmaprojects and compared the number of startups in their samples.  We found that Biocentury 




We used the patent and co-inventing data to construct an individual-level ego 
knowledge network for each startup. The scientists (patent inventors) of biotech firms are 
key individuals that hold the knowledge of the firms and exchange it with outside 
individuals.  They not only effectively exchange information with other scientists with 
whom they are directly connected but also source and deliver information to and from 
scientists with whom they are indirectly connected through their direct connections (Gulati, 
1999). In other words, the ego knowledge network for each firm consists of its own 
scientists, its co-inventors, and the co-inventors of its co-inventors. This individual-level 
ego knowledge network is the major channel through which startups source knowledge and 
information for alliances.      
Although patent issuing is a one-time event, the ties among inventors may last. As a 
result, we had to make an assumption about the duration of co-inventing ties. Following 
the assumptions of former researchers (Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2014), we assumed that 
co-inventing ties last for the five years following the patent issue date and then created ego 
knowledge networks based on five-year windows. For example, firms founded in 2010 
have nine snapshots of network structures (i.e., 2005-2010, 2006-2011,…2013-2018).  
Despite the many snapshots, variation among the snapshots at different time 
windows was minor. One reason for this phenomenon was the small number of startup 
patents.  The average startup in our sample had only 5.7 patents, most of which were 
invented by the same group of inventors. Therefore, the newly added patents in the later 
snapshots merely reinforced existing ties but did not expand the existing network. 
Secondly, even if some patents introduced some new inventors, these inventors were likely 
to be well-embedded in their current networks and already active in networks as co-
inventors or the co-inventors of co-inventors. Thus, although the 422 firms in our sample 




in our sample, 207 of them remained the same knowledge structure from the beginning to 
the end of the observational period.  
As we constructed our knowledge network based on issued patent data, we do not 
observe the collaborations that existed but instead were not portrayed by the patent data. 
Such latent ties may complement the knowledge network portrayed by patent co-inventing 
ties and channel information flows. Unfortunately, detecting hidden networks is difficult 
and this is a limitation of this project. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that observed 
hidden ties will lead to biased results or that their misidentification will increase the noise 
in the results. In addition, as the majority of these hidden ties existed within an organization 
or a region and were characterized by localization, we controlled the region with biotech 
clusters to reduce the noise caused by the hidden ties.  
2.3.3 Variables 
2.3.3.1 Independent Variables: Number of Knowledge Blocks and Cutpoints 
To calculate the number of blocks and cutpoints, we used the UCINET 6 
BiComponent.2 As this method of identifying a cutpoint differs from that of most papers 
in this area, we provide a comparison of the major broker measures in the next paragraph. 
In this paper, the average ego network of a firm consisted of 458 individuals that belong to 
84 blocks linked by 27 brokers (cutpoints).  As shown in Figure 3, some knowledge blocks 
consist of only two or three individuals, including the cutpoints. These blocks resemble 
information fragments rather than clusters and are less useful in alliance formation. In order 
                                                 




to reduce heterogeneity and retain the effectiveness of knowledge blocks, we considered 
blocks with three or more people as knowledge clusters.  
2.3.3.2 Dependent Variables:  
Among the 422 startups, 160 had formed alliances with incumbents by early 2018. 
The majority had only one alliance, and the highest number of alliances was 27. We tested 
our hypothesis with two dependent variables: (1) a dummy variable that equaled one for 
firms that had formed alliances; and (2) a count variable that equaled the number of 
alliances that a firm had. 
2.3.3.3 Control Variables 
Innovation Capability:  The innovation capability of firms comes from the 
inventors of the firm and the technology they have. Firms with strong inventor capabilities 
are usually embedded in a large diversified individual-level knowledge network. At the 
same time, the high-quality technology they have will attract more potential alliance 
partners and facilitate alliance formation. Therefore, we controlled the effect of innovation 
capability by controlling the capability of inventors and the quality of innovation. We used 
citation-weighted patents to control for the quality of innovation and the patent number-
weighted inventors to control for the capabilities of inventors.   
Our observations of patent citations started in the year a patent was issued and ended 
in November 2018. The lack of observations after 2018 introduced a “truncation bias,” that 
is, the bias that stems from the longer period in which earlier patents can accumulate 
citations (Sampat, Mowery, and Ziedonis, 2003). To eliminate the truncation bias to ensure 




each year and used all 243,343 related patents to generate a patent pool. The denominators 
equaled the average number of citations for all patents issued during a specific year in the 
patent pool. The citation-weighted value for each patent represented the total number of 
citations of that patent divided by the corresponding denominator. The quality of 
innovations for each firm was the summation of all citation-weighted patents for that 
startup. The weighting factor for inventors was the number of patents they had. The 
capability of inventors for a startup was the summation of all weighted inventors for that 
firm.  
Startup Size: The size of a startup was directly linked to the performance and the 
alliance formation of a startup. In this paper, we controlled for the size of startups by using 
the VC financing they had received. Because of the high cost of conducting biotechnology 
research and clinical tests, we assume that almost all biotech startups are supported by VC 
financing. The scale of the financing, however, varied, indicating the quality of the firm. 
To reduce the effect of a long tail in this paper, we took the log of the VC financing.  
Geographic Location. Of the 422 startups, 72 were located in Massachusetts 
(mainly the Boston area) and 142 in California (mainly the San Francisco Bay area), and 
the rest were scattered throughout the United States. As analyzed above, inventors in 
regions geographically clustered with many biotech companies were more likely to have 
hidden ties that the co-patenting network did not capture but in which information was 
transferred effectively. Furthermore, geographically co-locating increases the likelihood of 
alliance formation; thus, to control for the effect of geographic clustering, we added 




Technology Area: Similar to geographic clustering, technological clustering 
increases the probability of the formation of alliances and knowledge networks. The largest 
two technology areas in our sampled biotechnology firms were cancer- and cardio-related 
diseases. Therefore, we also added technology area dummies for startups that developed 
cancer and cardio treatments.  
To control for the influence from the external macro environment, we added 
dummies of the founding year of a firm.  However, we were not able to control for the size 
of the network, which is highly correlated with the number of knowledge blocks and the 
number of cutpoints. Although we were not able to use nodes as a control variable, we 
reported the value of this variable in the data statistics.  Since we controlled for the major 
endogenous factor in this process— the innovation capability of the startups, we assumed 
that the size of the network was exogenous from the alliance formation.  
2.3.4 Models 
The dependent variable in this study, alliance formation, was measured as either a 
dummy variable or a count variable and assumed only nonnegative integer values. The 
most widely used models in similar cases are logit models and negative binomial models 
with either fixed effects or random effects in which unobserved heterogeneity is controlled 
for. As mentioned in the network construction parts, around half of the sample had only 
one network, so the rest of the sample that could constitute a panel was too small and has 
selection bias in testing either the fixed effect or random effect models. Therefore, we only 
used logit and negative binomial models without fixed effects or random effects in the 




As an alternative, we adopted Cox Proportional Hazard (PH) models.  The estimation 
had the following specification:  
𝜆[𝑡|𝑥(𝑡)] =  𝜆0(𝑡)exp [𝑧(𝑡)
′β]exp (𝜔′𝛿),     
where 𝜆0(𝑡) is a time-variant nonparametric baseline hazard function that portrays 
the average probability of alliance formation during the life cycle of a startup, which 
eliminates the age effect from the probability of the alliance formation of a startup. The 
scale factor exp [𝑧(𝑡)′β] contains time-variant variables and the scale factor exp (𝜔′𝛿) 
contains time-invariant variables. Another reason for using the Cox PH model is that our 
observations of alliance formation ended in early 2018, and Cox PH models eliminated the 
bias caused by right-hand truncation.        
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Main Results 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for all of the variables for the 
422 observations in the sample. Although all firms in the sample were startups, they varied 
significantly on the majority of key variables, such as citation-weighted patents, patent-
weighted inventors, network size, and the number of cutpoints and knowledge blocks. The 
two independent variables were highly correlated, and both were highly correlated with the 
size of the network, measured as the number of nodes in a network. Hence, to control for 
the effect of the size of the network, we did not directly add a number of nodes in our 
models. As described earlier, to control for the network size, we had the variables of human 




weighted patents and patent weighted inventors, were significantly correlated with the 
number of nodes and expected to adequately control for the effect of network size. 
Table 2.2 - Data Statistics 
   





n    
     
Max 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Alliances Dummy 0.37 0.48 0 1 1         
2 
Number of 



















6 1      








0     
6 Nodes 
992.9








0 1    






















































# 2014          




rs         
1
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Because of the high correlation between independent variables, we tested the effect 
of independent variables in different models. Table 3 reports the Cox PH regression 
results for alliance formation.  The independent variable in (1) to (4)  was knowledge 
blocks and that in (5) to (8) was cutpoints. For each independent variable, the first models 




regional, category, and year dummies, the third models (3 and 9) added the log of VC 
investment to control for the external influence from VCs on both network expansion and 
alliance formation, and the fourth models (4 and 8) added citation-weighted patents and 
patent-weighted inventors to control for firm-level heterogeneity.  
The results are statistically significant and support both hypotheses 1 and 2. For each 
unit change, however, the coefficient was small on an economic scale. Having one more 
knowledge block increased the hazard by 0.1% and having one more cutpoint increased 
the hazard of forming alliances by 0.8%. As the startups in this sample, however, had an 
average of 90 knowledge blocks and 29 cutpoints with a large variance, the overall 
economic effect contributed to our understanding of the influence of knowledge blocks and 
cutpoints. For example, startups in the 90% percentile with 222 knowledge blocks were 
approximately 22% more likely to form alliances than those in the 10% percentile with 
only one knowledge block. Correspondingly, startups in the 75% percentile with 37 
cutpoints were 27% more likely to form alliances than those in the 25% percentile with 





Table 2.3 - The Results of Cox PH Models on Alliances Formation 
 
  Knowledge Blocks  Cutpoints 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Region Dummies  Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
         
Category 
Dummies  Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
         
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
         
Log(VC 




+    0.081+ 0.081+  




   0.007*     0.006* 
   -0.003     -0.003 
Patent Weighted 
Inventors 
   -0.000     -0.005 










*      
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
CutPoints 









     

























N 422 422 422 422   422 422 422 422 
Observations 2660 2660 2660 2660   2660 2660 2660 2660 
Standard errors in parentheses  + p<0.10  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
 
The results related to the baseline hazard ratio of forming alliances also merit 
discussion. The cumulative baseline hazard, shown in Figure 6, appears to be increasing at 
a steady speed, and the overall scale of the baseline hazard is small, which indicates almost 
no generalizable effect of alliance formation, that is, one that could apply to all firms.  It 




Alliance formation mainly depends on the endogenous heterogeneous resources of each 
firm.  Unlike the baseline hazard, the year dummies show a trend.  While the probability 
of firms forming alliances in 2008 is similar to that in 2012, the probability is higher in 
2013 than in 2018. The peak of the average probability of alliance formation is 2016, which 
is twice as high as the probability of alliance formation in 2008.  
 
Figure 2.6 - The cumulative baseline hazard function  
2.4.2 Robustness of Results 
We used logit models and negative binomial models to test the stability of the results 
on two measures of the dependent variable:  a dummy for having alliances and a count of 
the number of alliances. The results of the logit models are reported in Table 4, and the 
results of negative binomial models are reported in Table 5. The results of all models are 
consistent with those of the Cox PH models, and their coefficients are comparable in size. 
The only exception is that the coefficients of the cutpoints in some logit models, when 




models.  Thus, the results are qualitatively similar to the Cox PH model results and support 
both hypotheses 1 and 2.  
Table 2.4 - The Results of Logit Models on Alliances Formation 
 
  Knowledge Blocks  Cutpoints 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Region 
Dummies 
 Yes Yes Yes 
  Yes Yes Yes  
    
     
Category 
Dummies 
 Yes Yes Yes 
  Yes Yes Yes  
    
     
Year 
Dummies 
 Yes Yes Yes 
  Yes Yes Yes  
    
     
Log(VC 
Investment) 
  0.049* 0.050*    0.051* 0.050* 




   0.041**     0.041** 
   -0.006 




   0.003     0.001 
   -0.004 
    0.004 
Knowledge 
Network 
0.002** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**      
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
CutPoints     
 
0.007** 0.006** 0.004** 0.005**  
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Table 2.5 - The Results of Negative Binomial Models on Number of Alliances 
 
  Knowledge Blocks  Cutpoints 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Region 
Dummies 
 Yes Yes Yes 
  Yes Yes Yes  
    
     
Category 
Dummies 
 Yes Yes Yes 
  Yes Yes Yes  
    
     
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes  
    
     
Log(VC 
Investment) 
  0.047** 0.047** 
   
0.0470*
* 0.047** 




   0.003**     0.041** 
   -0.001 




   0.010**     0.003** 
   -0.001 
    -0.001 
Knowledge 
Network 
0.156** 0.143** 0.134** 0.099**      
0.026 0.028 0.028 0.031      
CutPoints     
 
0.003** 0.002** 0.001** 0.002** 
 
    
 











0.027 0.279 0.170 0.167  

























N 422 422 422 422   422 422 422 422 
Standard errors in parentheses  + p<0.10  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 
The veraible of knoweldge network has been standardized in this model to increase the readability. 
One concern regarding our results is whether the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables are linear and whether their sizes remain the same 
among different groups. We added a variable that equals the square of the independent 




blocks was statistically significant, but the economic value was almost zero, and the 
coefficient of the square of the cutpoint was not significant. Therefore, the curvature was 
not a concern of this study.  Another concern related to whether the results were driven by 
a few extreme values. To test this, we dropped the bottom and top 10% of the sample based 
on the value of the independent variable and tested the new sample using all models but 
found no significant differences from the main results, which excluded the possibility that 
the results were driven by extreme values.  
2.5 Discussion 
As firms are embedded in their existing interfirm alliance network, their current 
alliances and third-party alliance ties are useful predictors of future alliances. Although 
above theories could explain alliance formation for incumbents, it does not provide insights 
for startups that enter the market without existing formal alliances. This study hypothesizes 
that when formal alliances are lacking, it is individual-level informal ties that serve as 
channels for knowledge diffusion and information transformation.  The study examines 
how the structural characteristics of the collaboration network of inventors influence the 
alliance formation of startups through their influence on information transformation. The 
theoretical analysis suggested that the number of knowledge networks, which expands the 
diversity of the knowledge stock in the network, and the number of cutpoints, which 
facilitate the efficiency of information transformation, are positively related to the alliance 
formation of startups. The empirical results support our hypothesis. 
The results of this study suggest that the social capital of a firm may originate from 
its inventors and the fundamental unit of analysis of the social capital of organizations is 
the individuals in that organization.  This paper contributes to the literature on alliance 




foundation method. It also contributes by studying the effect of structural characteristics 
and the positions of individuals. Unlike former papers that focus on individual-level 
influences, this paper examines the individual effects on an organization. Our methodology 
and findings illustrate the possibility of a cross-level analysis in the social network area.  
One limitation of this paper is that we assumed network ties were exogenous. 
Interpersonal ties, however, may be endogenously intentionally formed by inventors 
(Coleman, 1988).  Although we have control variables on innovation quality, human 
capital, and firm size to reduce the potential effect of the capability of firms, the formation 
of individual ties may still be influenced by some unobservable firm-level decisions and 
activities that we were unable to capture. Therefore, the regression estimates could have 
overstated the true causal effect.  Future work could mitigate such a problem by using an 
effective instrumental variable or conducting natural experiments.   
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CHAPTER 3. THE NOVELTY OF INNOVATION AND EXIT 
ACTIVITIES OF HIGH-TECH STARTUPS 
3.1 Introduction 
In the Schumpeterian view of the entrepreneur, growth-oriented startups are typically 
tied to an innovation (Schumpeter, 1934), and the nature of this innovation has persistent 
effects on the long-term opportunities available to the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1985; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1986) and its commercialization 
activities (Nerkar and Shane, 2007). Extant research on technology and startup activites 
has found that the attributes of the innovation influence the likelihood of commercialization 
(Nerkar and Shane, 2007), determine whether the commercialization is through new or 
incumbent firms (Shane, 2001), and affect the rate of growth of the new firm (Clarysse, 
Wright, and de Velde, 2011).  
Among the many attributes of innovation, its novelty (or its pioneering nature), 
which offers startups a first-mover advantage both in terms of market positioning and 
movement down the learning curve (Levin, Klevoick, Nelson, and Winter, 1987; Ahuja 
and Lampert, 2001) and potentially undermines incumbent technologies (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986), is one of the dimensions that characterize the technological opportunities 
and influences the commercialization strategy and performance of high-tech startups. 
Many startups with novel innovations have achieved great success, and these examples 
tend to be very familiar to us. For example, Netflix and other streaming content providers 
are rapidly replacing traditional cable and TV networks in the media industry, and have 




of startups with novel innovations,3 thereby creating a false impression that novelty is 
necessarily good for performance.  Indeed, we know little about the effect of novelty on 
the performance of startups in representative samples not subject to recall bias.  
Although there is a growing literature examining the effect that novelty has on 
commercialization activities, these studies are almost all focused on the early stage of 
commercialization activities, such as the likelihood of entering production and access to 
venture capital funding (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013; Samila and Sorenson, 2011; 
Nerkar and Shane, 2007; Shane, 2001).4 However, the effect of novelty on the longer term 
performance of startups and the financial return of novel innovation to external investors 
remains largely unexplored. 
In this paper we consider new questions about the relationship between novelty and 
performance among startups. We first analyze the novelty-performance relationship by 
looking at the link between the novelty of innovation at the time of a firms’ creation to the 
likelihood of it having a successful exit, whether in form of an IPO or being acquired. We 
think this is a good measure of performance in the sample we study (see, for example, 
Fuller and Rothaermel, 2012; Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013; Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf, 
2015), especially as all firms in the sample have received external financing. To ensure a 
financial return to external investors, startups must establish an exit strategy, and firms are 
usually considered failures by VCs when they cannot successfully exit for many years.  
                                                 
3   The failure rate for innovative startups is close to 90 percent (Payne, 2014).  
4 There is also a parallel literature studying novelty in incumbents. The research questions are mainly on: 
how the knowledge base influences the internal and external exploration activities of incumbents and the 
productivity of novel innovations (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Zhou and Wu, 2010; Zhou and Li, 2012); 
what strategies and resources are needed for incumbents to appropriate value from novel innovations 
(Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu, 2003); and what effect cooperative strategies 




For startups hoping for a successful exit, the most important strategic task is to 
develop and commercialize their innovation, which requires the acquisition of 
complementary assets and capabilities. One of the most important methods for startups to 
acquire complementary resources and increase their early-stage performance is through 
forming strategic alliances with incumbents (Rothaermel and Boeker, 2007; Rothaermel 
and Deeds, 2004). In this paper, we therefore also analyze how the novelty of innovation 
influences the formation of strategic alliances, and how in turn alliance formation may 
influence the successful exit of startups. 
A challenge in the study of novelty is to devise an objective scale with which to 
measure it. In the previous literature, two methods have been adopted. The first infers the 
novelty of innovations from surveys and retrospective coding, a method that is widely used 
by marketing scholars (Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu, 2003). One limitation of the survey 
approach is that it is difficult to avoid selection biases that lead to an overrepresentation of 
successful novel innovations because the ones that failed are not recalled by respondents 
(Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu, 2003). Another limitation of this type of measure is that 
they are more suitable for case studies or small sample analysis because of difficulty in 
collecting such data. 
The second type of measure, which is capable of evaluating the novelty of 
innovations from a large unbiased sample, is patent-based, the most popular of which for 
some time was a backward citation-based measure that checks the number of technological 
subclasses a patent cites that outside its own classes (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Nerkar and 
Shane, 2007; Shane, 2001). Fleming (2001) proposed a variation of this measure, reflecting 
the notion that invention is a process of recombination of existing ideas that measures the 
frequency of new combinations of US Patent Office Classification (USPC) technology 




Bakker, and Veugelers (2016) made some improvements to Felming’s measure and applied 
their measure to test the effect that novelty has on science and technology discoveries. 
Their work illustrates that using group-level International Patent Classification (IPC) codes 
is better than using subclasses from the USPC in researching questions related to the 
scientific impact of novel innovations (Verhoeven et al, 2016). However, the most suitable 
measure for questions about firm performance is under-explored.  
This paper attempts improve upon these existing measures in several dimensions. 
First, the measure of novelty in this paper is based on the relatively new Cooperative Patent 
Classification (CPC) system, which was released in 2013. The CPC system is an extension 
of the IPC system and is now the main classification system in Europe, the United States, 
and many Asian countries. Similar to the IPC system, the CPC system has five hierarchy 
levels. The knowledge distance between classes at different hierarchy levels varies, which 
directly influence the probability of novelty and its extent. Pervious papers have used the 
subclass level (Fleming, 2001) and the main group level (Verhoeven et al, 2016), but it is 
unclear which knowledge distance is more suitable for management research. Therefore, 
this paper measures novelty at both subclass level and subgroup level. The results for the 
two levels of analysis are consistent, but the measure at subgroup level is more significant 
both economically and statistically.  
In this paper, we use multiple data sources to construct a panel of 408 startups that 
received external financing in the healthcare industries, and we tracked the startups from 
their birth to their exit or the end of 2017. Our data sources enabled us to include a wide 
range of controls as we examine the relationship between novelty and performance. Our 
main findings are as follows: Novelty has a negative effect on likelihood that startups will 




difficulty to form alliances for startups with novel innovation. Furthermore, compared to 
acquisition, IPO is a higher probability exit method for startups with novel innovation.  
The results of this paper provide useful information on how the novelty of innovation 
influences the commercialization strategy of startups and, therefore, influences firm 
performance. This paper contributes to the growing body of work analyzing how the 
novelty of innovation influences commercialization activities (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 
2013; Samila and Sorenson, 2011; Nerkar and Shane, 2007; Shane, 2001). Also, this paper 
complements the work examining the effect that novelty has on corporate strategies 
(Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Prabhu, Chandy, and Ellis, 2005), 
although, in contrast to previous work that has the incumbent as the focus of analysis, this 
paper studies high-tech startups.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
It is widely accepted that the creation of innovation is a process of recombining 
existing knowledge and that innovation is either "a new relationship between previously 
combined components" or "a new combination of components" (Henderson and Clark, 
1990; Fleming, 2001). In this paper, we define an innovation from new combinations of 
knowledge, which represents the degree to which an innovation differs from previous 
innovations in that field (Shane, 2001), as an innovation with the attribute of novelty.  
It is true that the novelty of an innovation is the potential origin of the “first mover 
advantage” (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988) and provides a learning curve advantage 
(Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter, 1987).  Also, because of the substantial capital 




more resources are in a better position to commercialize their novel innovations (Cohen 
and Klepper, 1996). However, high-tech startups, the majority of which are resource 
constrained, often lack the resources to manifest the advantages of their innovations while 
to bear the related risk and uncertainty.   
The commercialization of novel innovations requires a long-term process of 
development that entails enormous technological risks. In the process of technological 
development, pure technological risks originate with an inventor’s process of searching for 
unfamiliar components and combining new knowledge components (Fleming, 2001). As 
more and more inventors explore the use and the characteristics of a new technology, the 
risk will subside (Fleming, 2001; March, 1991). Through both formal and informal ties, 
the inventors in a specific area share their experience and knowledge at both organizational 
and individual levels (Ahuja, 2000; Stuart, 1998). In other words, the knowledge flow 
among inventors in one area facilitate the cumulative development of knowledge, so the 
risk that an innovation entails is alleviated. Thus, for conventional innovations, the 
technological risk involved in knowledge selection and recombination activities in the 
technology development process is limited. Unlike conventional innovations, novel 
innovations have been under-explored, so their technology development processes entail 
higher technological risk.  
Because of the high market uncertainties involved in the market selection process, 
very few novel innovations have become popular radical innovations and achieve market 
success (Chandy and Tellis, 1998). Startups with a novel innovation enter a market (or 
submarket) at an early stage of an industry (Nelson and Winter, 1982), when little is known 
about how  a new product will incorporate a novel technology and to what extent the novel 
innovation will fulfill the needs of key customers  (Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu, 2003). 




value, very few successfully pass through the market selection process (Nelson and 
Winter1982; Sorescu et al., 2003). At the early stage of an industry, a great deal of 
uncertainty exists regarding the extent and time frame of the adoption of a product (Griffin, 
1997). Also, the product from a novel innovation frequently enters the market with defects, 
which severely limits the realization of its value and increases the risks associated with the 
product (Suarez and Utterback, 1995). Furthermore, the application of a novel innovation 
must be legally sanctioned, generating even more market uncertainty. For example, 
although a variety of euthanasia drugs have been launched, only a few countries in the 
world have sanctioned their use but done so under limited conditions.  
The reduction of the technology risk and market uncertainty associated with a novel 
innovation demands a strong commercialization capability to absorb, interpret, and 
commercialize critical information effectively (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998).  Such a 
capability requires the synthesis of a variety of resources (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; 
Sorescu, et al., 2003), which high-tech startups do not typically have. Therefore, because 
of the high technology risk and market uncertainty and the lack of resources, high-tech 
startups with a novel innovation have a lower probability of a successful exit.  Thus, we 
posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis1: The novelty of an innovation of a high-tech startup is negatively associated 
with the probability of its successful exit. 
 
It is critical for startups, being both resource and capital constrainted, to obtain 
resources and capabilities to reduce the risk and uncertainty involved in commercializing 
their novel innovation and increase the probability of a successful exit. An important 
method of acquiring resources and capabilities is the formation of alliances with 




orchestrate an integrative alliance system that leverages the exploration and exploitation of 
alliances in a sequential fashion achieve superior product development performance. 
Forming alliances with incumbents enables startups to gain access to complementary assets 
(Arora and Gambardella, 1990), enhance their legitimacy (Baum and Oliver, 1991), and 
improve their early stage performance (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000). 
Furthermore, strategic alliances can help startups resolve information asymmetry in the 
capital market, which directly increases the probability of an IPO (Ozmel, Robinson, and 
Stuart, 2012).  
Even though the formation of alliances with incumbents is important to the 
successful commercialization of a firm’s innovations, the novelty of an innovation actually 
hinders the formation of alliances, which partially contributes to the negative effect of 
novelty on the probability of a successful exit. Startups are more likely to enter strategic 
alliances to gain access to complementary assets when they are younger (Rothaermel and 
Boeker, 2007). However, when the startup is young, it is hard for others to incumbents to 
identify, evaluate, and write a contract in a novel innovation, whose market value and usage 
is unclear. Although the development processes resolve the information asymmetry and 
uncertainty related to a novel innovation, these processes also generate unique tacit 
knowledge that increases the difficulty and transaction cost for downstream alliances. 
Thus, the novelty of the innovation hinders the formation of all types of alliances between 
startups and incumbents. 
The majority of novel innovations are early-stage technologies that originate from 
basic science discoveries, so they are far from the market stage (Jensen and Thursby, 2001). 
Because of their need for resources and experience in technological development, high-
tech startups seek upstream alliances with incumbents. A novel innovation, which involves 




knowledge base of incumbents, creates challenges to the absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1991) of incumbents to identify and correctly evaluate the potential value of the 
innovation. Because of the myopia of learning, incumbents are more likely to identify an 
innovation and its opportunities that closely relate to their current knowledge base 
(Levintal and March, 1993). Thus, firms with novel innovations that are not a logical 
extension of existing knowledge find it more difficult to attract the attention of incumbents 
(Rosenbloom and Christiansen 1994). After all, even if an incumbent becomes aware of 
the existence of a novel innovation, the difficulty of understanding and evaluating its value 
(Rosenbloom and Christiansen 1994) may deter incumbents from forming alliances with a 
startup at an early stage.  
In addition to the challenges to the absorptive capacity of incumbents, contracting an 
early stage novel innovation also poses challenges that hinder the formation of upstream 
alliances. For one, because of the information asymmetry, the perceived risk will be higher 
and the perceived value lower for incumbent than for startups, which decreases the 
likelihood of achieving an agreement on the value appropriation of the novel innovation 
(Somaya, Kim, and Vonortas, 2010). In addition, novel innovations entail more inherent 
uncertainty that includes both risks and potential opportunities, rendering the contract 
substantially incomplete (Aghion and Tirole, 1994). If an innovation eventually has broad 
application, an incomplete contact may result in an incomplete value appropriation by some 
parties. In some cases, value spillover may also lead to a conflict of interest in the product 
market. The difficulty of achieving an agreement regarding the value of an innovation and 
the substantial incompleteness of a contact hampers the formation of upstream alliances 
between startups with a novel innovation and incumbents. 
After successfully developing their technologies, startups need to build specific 




Vonortas, 2010). The downstream capability need by startups are manufacturing, 
distribution, sales and marketing capabilities and human capital (Hoang and Rothaermel, 
2010). Building downstream capability is both time consuming and challenging.  For 
example, the value of a sales force in the medical device industry resides in the services it 
provides, which includes training doctors to use medical devices and solving medical 
disputes arising from the use of the devices. Thus, as the sales of medical devices rely on 
the trust and ties between sales forces and doctors, startups find it difficult to build such 
trust and ties within a short time. Incumbents, however, with their rich downstream 
capabilities, are natural strategic alliance partners for startups with well-developed 
technology (Rothaermel and Boeker, 2007). However, if startups with novel innovation are 
unable to form upstream alliances, then they will also find it difficult forming downstream 
alliances because incumbents lack the tacit knowledge generated in the technology 
development process. 
Novel innovations pose extra challenges for downstream alliances because the 
cooperation between incumbents and startups demands the transaction of an enormous 
amount of tacit knowledge (Jensen and Thursby, 2001). A novel innovation, characterized 
by its newness and its close relationship to basic science, entails more tacit and complex 
knowledge (Jensen and Thursby, 2010). Because of its newness, however, novel 
innovations has been underexplored, so its development process requires more experiments 
that entail more time, a process that generates more tacit knowledge critical for the 
downstream commercialization process (Jensen and Thursby, 2001). Therefore, the 
successful formation of a downstream alliance that encompasses a novel innovation 
requires the successful transaction of tacit knowledge, which is a challenge to the 




knowledge, the knowledge transfer process will greatly increase the transaction costs of 
the alliance (Williamson, 1985).  
Because the purpose of downstream alliances is to leverage existing 
complementarities between partners, incumbents usually enjoy a learning-by-doing effect 
by repeatedly forming downstream alliances with firms similar to them (Hoang and 
Rothaermel, 2010; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2007). The investment of the incumbents of 
downstream alliances, therefore, mainly focus on incremental improvements and 
refinements to existing routines (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2010). The downstream 
capabilities demanded by a novel innovation, however, are frequently unique (Somaya et 
al, 2010), requiring incumbents to make specific investments if they want to successfully 
commercialize the innovation. Not only does this entail extra cost, it represents a deviation 
from the core activities of the incumbent, which is what many incumbents reluctant to do.  
We conclude that forming alliances is important for the successful exit of startups, 
especially those with novel innovations. The novelty of an innovation, nevertheless, 
hinders the formation of upstream alliances because incumbents find it difficult to 
recognize, evaluate, and contract a novel innovation at an early stage; and the novelty of 
an innovation hampers the formation of downstream alliances because it entails high 
transaction costs and investment in specific downstream capabilities.  Following this logic, 
we expect to observe that the formation of alliances partially mediates the negative effect 
of novelty on a successful exit. Thus, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The negative effect of the novelty of an innovation on a successful exit 





Although not all novel innovations become valuable radical innovations that either 
create a new market or disrupt an existing market, all valuable radical innovations are 
characterized by novelty.  When a novel innovation exhibits its market value, it is common 
for incumbents to acquire the new technology using external sourcing (Arora, Cohen, 
Walsh, 2016). Common external sourcing methods for incumbents are forming strategic 
alliances (Rothaermel, 2001), acquiring the firm (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006), and hiring 
inventors (Bei, 2018). The previous discussion suggested that novelty hinders the 
formation of strategic alliances between startups and incumbents. Similarly, although 
acquisition is an important method for incumbents to gain access to an external innovation, 
they may cautiously use this approach to acquire a novel innovation cautiously because of 
the potential challenges of learning and integrating the diverse capabilities of the two firms 
(Lane and Lubakin, 1998).  
Nonetheless, incumbents do sometimes acquire startups to enhance their novel 
innovations. On January 16, 2018, Celgene acquired Juno for $9 billion to advance their 
research into a novel class of therapies known as CAR-T.  Celgene and Juno, however, 
were not random strangers. Mark J. Alles, CEO of Celgene, stated that the purpose for the 
acquisition was the “shared vision to discover and develop transformative medicines for 
patients with incurable blood cancers.”  As the knowledge base and the business strategy 
of the two firms were similar, Celgene and Juno began to form strategic alliances in 2015, 
and Celgene had already owned 9.7% of Juno’s shares before the acquisition. Therefore, 
not only did the acquisition of Celgene and Juno stem from similarities between the two, 
but it was also strengthened by former strategic alliances. 
Startups with novel innovations often differ from incumbents with regard to their 
knowledge bases, business strategies, and organizational structures. The dissimilarity 




two firms (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). At the same time, as incumbents are likely to 
adhere to their current routines, a radical change in their routines will undermine the value 
of the assets they already have (Shane, 2001). In these situations, rather than acquisition, 
incumbents should prefer hire scientists and inventors who possess not only the required 
novel knowledge but also technological capabilities (Bei, 2018). Sourcing external 
innovation by hiring talent to join current R&D teams, incumbents can organically 
integrate and absorb novel knowledge that will more likely be consistent with their current 
business context and practice and thus increase the probability of success.  Thus, startups 
with a novel innovation that choose to exit through acquisition have less likelihood of 
success. 
To raise money, high-tech startups rely on strategic alliances, acquisition, and 
venture capital funding (Ozmel, Robinson, and Stuart, 2012).  Although novelty has a 
negative effect on alliance formation and the probability of acquisition, it benefits startups 
by attracting VC funding (Shane, 2001; Samila and Sorenson, 2011; Cunningham, 2017), 
which raises the following question: If the novelty of an innovation is associated with high 
risk and a lower probability of a successful exit, why are VCs more inclined to finance 
novel innovations? One answer to this question is that VC investors, with mindsets of 
experimentation and a willingness to accept failure, embrace risk in their investments 
(Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013). The investment strategy for VCs is to bet on the small 
probability of a few extreme successes and bear the greater probability of a large number 
of failures. Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) quoted one VC investor as saying, “Our 
willingness to fail gives us the ability and opportunity to succeed where others may fear to 
tread.”  Novel innovations, despite their higher failure rate, have the potential to become 
extremely successful by generating new industries or disrupting the current market (Shane, 




performance of a startup. Apart from providing financial capital, VCs, especially 
experienced ones, also benefit startups by connecting them with potential partners and 
increasing the probability of their forming strategic alliances (Lindsey, 2008).  Many paper 
found that VC investment increases the probability of a firm’s exit through an IPO.  
Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013) found that when VCs invested in riskier and more 
innovative startups conditional on going public, the startups are valued higher on the day 
of their initial public offering.  In this paper, we believe the “risk and more innovative” 
comes from the novelty of innovation. Therefore, we expect to see a positive relationship 
between novelty and the IPO market value of a startup. Although predicting overall 
whether the benefits of more funding invested in a novel innovation and the treatment 
effect of VC funding exceed the risks involved in commercialization processes, firms with 
a novel innovation that exit through an IPO have a higher probability of success than those 
that exit through acquisition.  Thus, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Exiting through an IPO is higher probability event than exiting through 
acquisition for startups with novel innovation, and among the firms that exit through an 
IPO, those with novel innovations have higher market value.  
 
3.3 Setting, Data, and Empirical Strategy  
3.3.1 Data 
The sample consists of 408 startups with external financing in the healthcare area, 
followed by the time of entry until their exit or 2017, whichever is earlier. These 408 
startups were screened out from Crunchbase. We began by selecting healthcare startups 
with external financing that were founded between 1990 and 2010 in North America. Then 




within three years of their establishment and manually checked founding team information 
for each startup. Then we deleted the spinouts of incumbents since they are equipped with 
resources that differ from those of non-spinouts. After deleting samples with missing 
values for critical variables, 408 startups with external funding in the healthcare area 
remained in the sample. They included the biotech, pharmaceutical, medical device, and 
all other healthcare service industries.  
We collected basic firm information from Crunchbase, acquired patent-related data 
from USPTO and other resources, and hand-collected founding team information. The 
variables acquired from Crunchbase included external financing, firm industry, geographic 
location, founding time, exit time, and exit mode.  For the matching process, we used the 
Harvard Patent Disambiguated Assignee Dataset and obtained patent claim data from the 
USPTO Patent Claims Research Dataset, constructed by Marco, Sarnoff, and deGrazia 
(2016), and patent classification data from USPTO PatentViews. The hand-collected 
founding team information included the involvement of the inventor, the size of the 
founding team, and the entrepreneurial and industry experience and academic degrees of 
the founders. We combine the alliances data from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum and 
BioCentury and merged the alliances data with our sample based on firm names. The 
market value for startups that exited through an IPO are collected from Yahoo Finance.  
All startups in our sample received one or more rounds of funding from VC investors 
and/or other forms of investment. Because the potential of startups must be sufficient to 
attract at least one round of venture funding, the startups in my sample are more inclined 
to be on the right-hand side of the value distribution and have a high exit success rate 
compared to a random sample.  However, because our paper focuses on testing the effect 
of a novelty on the performance of startups after they receive VC funding, this biased 





3.3.2.1 Combinational Novelty of a Patent  
This paper uses the pairwise combination of the CPC (cooperative patent 
classification) system as a proxy for the novelty of patents.  This measure is based on the 
patent novelty measure conceived by Fleming (2001), Verhoeven, Bakker, and Veugelers 
(2016), and Uzzi et al. (2013). The classification assignment of the CPC system is based 
on the subject of the knowledge that the patent contains. Therefore, the knowledge 
elements used by a patent are represented by the technological classifications assigned to 
the patent by patent examiners, and the collection of the pairwise combinations of the 
technological classification are proxies for the knowledge recombination behind that 
patent. The patent is considered novel when it introduces a new knowledge element into 
the area, expressed as the appearance of a new pairwise combination of a CPC 
classification.  
The CPC classification code is categorized into subdivisions that represent the 
knowledge element.  A subdivision is based on a five-level hierarchy system that divides 
knowledge into nine sections and then into classes, subclasses, main groups, and 
subgroups.5  The technology distance is smaller for knowledge elements that differ more 
at the subgroup level than at other higher levels. Therefore, the risk and the value of 
introducing a knowledge element that is novel at several hierarchy levels are expected to 
                                                 
5For example, patent number 7700302 is in CPC class “A61K 39/39541.”  “A” is the section number, and all 
patents classified into section A are human necessities. “A61,” a classification at theclass level, represents 
medical or veterinary science. The classification at the subclass level for this patent is “A61K,” which 
represents knowledge about or preparation for medical, dental, or toiletry purposes. Under subclass 
“A61K,” this patent belongs to group “39,” the category of medicinal preparations containing antigens or 
antibodies, represented by the full classification at subgroup level “A61K 39/39541.” Based on the 





differ.  To test the effect of the novelty of knowledge at various technological distance 
levels, we measure the novelty of a patent at the middle hierarchy, subclass, and subgroup 
(the lowest) levels.  The CPC system contains approximately 650 different subclasses and 
more than 260,000 subgroups.  
At the subclass level, the most widely used proxy of novelty is a dummy variable 
that equals one for patents that contain at least one pair of new classification combinations. 
To capture the novelty of a patent at the subclass level, this paper uses the smallest 
frequency of a patent’s pairwise combinations, a measure generated by Uzzi et al. (2013).  
Instead of using a dummy to represent the appearance of a new knowledge element, using 
the frequency of pairwise combinations is more informative because it portrays the life 
cycle of a technology behind the knowledge used in the patent.  Because innovation is both 
an input and an output to the technology area, the new knowledge combination will be 
selected and reused by other inventors, that is, a process of the evolution of that technology. 
The older a technology is and the more widely it is used, the higher the frequency of the 
pairwise combination. Hence, the frequency represents the evolution of the technology, a 
process in which uncertainty and value change.   
My sample statistics show that when measured at the subgroup level, the majority of 
patents have at least one new pairwise combination, so the proxy of novelty used in this 
paper at the subgroup level is the proportion of novel combinations.  As mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, the CPC system divides knowledge into 650 subclasses and 260,000 
subgroups, generating 210,915 and 33,799,870,000 possible (but not necessarily existing 
in current patents) pairwise combinations at the subclass and subgroup levels, respectively.  
Because of the prevalence of new subgroup combinations in my sample, new subgroup 




knowledge at the various subclass levels is larger than that at the various subgroup levels.6  
My proxy of novelty at the subclass level represents the newest knowledge combination of 
knowledge elements with some knowledge distance, and my proxy of the novelty at the 
subgroup level represents the overall newness of a knowledge measure in the smallest 
knowledge division. 
In this sample, the mean frequency of a combination at the subclass level is 28,811 
and the max value equals 526,394. The distribution of the frequency is highly skewed on 
the right-hand side. The frequency is calculated as the cumulative number of all patents 
issued after 1976.  Therefore, the pairwise combinations of patents issued in later years 
will have a higher average frequency. To eliminate the effect caused by different years of 
issue, we standardize the combination frequency for patents issued in one year and find 
that after the yearly standardization, the distribution of combination frequency is still 
highly skewed on the right-hand side. To minimize the effects of outliers and facilitate 
regression, we take the natural log of the standardized value and find that the final 
distribution of the combination frequency at the subclass level is similar to a normal 
distribution with a mean of 0.89 and a max of 1.62.  The distribution of the proportion of 
novelty at the subgroup level is also similar to the normal distribution with a mean of 0.45 
and a max of 1. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the distribution of novelty measured at the 
subclass and subgroup levels. 
                                                 
6Also take patent number 7700302 as an example.  Besides its classification as “A61K 39/39541,” it can be 
classified as “C07K 2317/21” or “C07K 2317/76.”  At the subclass level, “A61K” represents the knowledge 
or preparation for medical, dental, or toilet purposes, and “C07K” represents peptides. As it shows, 
“A61K” and “C07K” represent two different knowledge groups, and the knowledge distance is large.  At 
the group level, “C07K 2317” represents immunoglobulins, and subgroup “21” characterizes 
immunoglobulins by their taxonomic origin from primates while subgroup “76” characterizes 
immunoglobulins by their effects. Therefore, any difference at the subgroup level in this case merely 
characterizes one material from another, and the knowledge distance is small. It is also common for one 





Figure 3.1 - Frequency distribution of novelty measured at the subclass level 
 






To acquire more comprehensive data on alliances, this paper combines the alliance 
data from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum with the data from BioCentury and finds that 
95 out of the 408 startups formed alliances before their exit, and the average number of 
alliances was 0.7. To coordinate the different models, we include both the number of 
alliances and a dummy variable that represents the existence of at least one alliance in this 
paper.  
3.3.2.3 Control Variables 
Many papers have found that the performance of startups is influenced by their 
resources, human capital, funding, and the external environment, which includes the 
geographic location, the industry, and macroeconomic conditions. The most valuable 
resources for non-spinout startups in high-tech industries at the founding stage are their 
intellectual property, portrayed by the independent variables. To control for the human 
capital of a top management team at the founding stage, this paper selected five hand-
collected variables and controlled for the external environment by both categorical 
variables and the empirical model, which will be introduced in a later section.   
The Human Capital of a Top Management Team.  All five variables of founders 
were hand-collected.  The information source included LinkedIn, Bloomberg, CrunchBase, 
and company and university websites. To reduce the effect of missing values on some 
founders, we use team-level variables as controls.  About 90% of the values are accurate 
and the remaining 10% randomly assigned.  
Team size. As entrepreneurship demands a variety of skills, numerous studies on 




teams usually show stronger performance than firms founded by a small team, and firms 
founded by entrepreneurial teams, on average, exhibit stronger performance than firms 
founded by individual entrepreneurs.  To control for the influence of team size, this paper 
uses categorical variables that equal 0 if a firm was founded by an individual entrepreneur, 
1 if a firm was founded by a small entrepreneurial team (i.e., teams with two to four 
members), 2 if the firm was founded by a large entrepreneurial team (i.e., teams with five 
or more people).  
Entrepreneurial and industry experience.  Both entrepreneurial and industry 
experience are important to the learning process of entrepreneurs when they acquire 
managerial and entrepreneurial knowledge.  Many scholars that have analyzed the effects 
of entrepreneurial and/or industry experience on firm performance have found that they are 
positively related.  This study adopts two dummy variables as proxies for the industry and 
entrepreneurial experience of a startup team. The dummy variable equals 1 when at least 
one of the founders in the team had industry/entrepreneurial experience. The absolute 
majority of entrepreneurial teams, except for a few academic teams, had at least one 
individual with industry experience. 
Ph.D. or M.D. degree.  Industries in the healthcare area are high-tech industries in 
which the successful commercialization of an invention depends on the founding team’s 
expert knowledge in that area.  A founding team that includes professionals with Ph.D. or 
M.D. degrees will influence the quality of an innovation and the success of 
commercialization. Therefore, we add a dummy variable equaling 1 if the founding teams 
had at least one professional with a Ph.D. or M.D. degree.  
Founder inventor.  This variable distinguishes between two types of technology 




technology he/she has invented, and the other is one in which entrepreneurs commercialize 
the technology they have licensed from the inventor.  Since a great deal of knowledge is 
tacit and transferable only by the inventor, the technology commercialized by the inventor 
is advantageous to further R&D processes.  Fuller and Rothaermel (2012) provided 
evidence that inventors choose to commercialize a higher quality technology, which is 
associated with greater commercialization success. Thus, we generate a dummy variable 
that represents the involvement of an inventor by manually checking the LinkedIn profiles 
of patent inventors to determine whether they were members of the founding team of the 
firm.  
Geographic location.  High-tech firms in close proximity may experience 
knowledge flow among them.  Such a flow of knowledge influences the innovation quality 
of all firms in that cluster. Firms located in regions with a high density of VCs are more 
likely, on average to attract VC financing than firms located in regions with a low density 
of VCs.  Thus, geographic clustering may influence innovation quality and 
commercialization performance at the same time. To control for the potential endogeneity 
of geographic clustering, we add dummy variables for states with a high density of high-
tech startups and/or VCs, such as California, Massachusetts, Texas, Pennsylvania, and 
Florida. 
Industry Dummies.  Studies of markets for ideas and technology have found that the 
external commercialization environment may influence the commercialization strategies 
and final exit modes of startups. Those in our sample belong to biotech, pharma, medical 
devices, and other healthcare service industries, so we add dummies to control for the inter-




External Funding. External funding sources for the sample firms are mainly venture 
capitalists (VC), debts, and government grants.  VC funding accounts for the majority of 
overall external funding. Around 78% of the data are accurate and the remaining 22% 
missing this value are filled with the average value of the sample. The statistics of major 
variables are listed in Table 1 below.  
Table 3.1 - Data Summary of Major Variables 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Count of Scope 5.65 7.44 1 84 
Count of Scope^2 87.10 410.37 1 7056 
Novelty (subclass) 0.89 0.39 0 1.62 
Novelty (subgroup) 0.45 0.23 1 1 
External Funding 58700000 69100000 187291 686000000 
Log (eternal funding) 17.19 1.47 12.14 20.35 
Alliance 0.61 1.97 0 23 
Alliance Dummy 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Founding Year 2001.34 4.75 1990 2010 
 Privet  Acquisition IPO  








Industry  215 159 34  
 Single Founder Small Team 
Large 
Team  
Founding Team Size 137 252 19  
  No Yes   











The most widely used model in this paper is the Cox Proportional Hazard model, a 
semiparametric model that examines the influence of technology attributes on the 
probability of a successful exit. The observation starts with the year a firm was founded 
and ends either at the firm’s exit from the market or at the end of 2017 as right censored.  
The model specification, given below, is 𝜆[𝑡|𝑥(𝑡)], the hazard function, which depends on  
𝜆0(𝑡), a time-variant nonparametric baseline hazard function,  exp [𝑧(𝑡)
′β], a scale factor 
that contains time-variant variables, and exp (𝜔′𝛿), a scale factor that contains time-
invariant variables: 
                       𝜆[𝑡|𝑥(𝑡)] =  𝜆0(𝑡)exp [𝑧(𝑡)
′β]exp (𝜔′𝛿) .                                             
All independent and control variables that describe the founding condition are time-
invariant. Therefore, to estimate them, we employ the time-invariant scale factor.  Two 
types of time-varying variables may influence an exit decision:  the age and the external 
conditions of a firm. The external conditions include financial market conditions, such as 
the three-month T-bill rate, industry conditions, such as the industry average debt factor 
and the industry concentration, and macroeconomic conditions, such as the volume of the 
IPO relative to mergers (Brau et al., 2013; Chemmanur et al., 2010). Since all external 
conditions are related to a specific fiscal year and used only as control variables, we add 
year dummies as the time-variant scale factor of the function. We also use the 
nonparametric baseline hazard function to adjust the hazard rate influenced by the firm age.   
Apart from the Cox PH models, logit models are used not only in cases in which the 
time that the focal-event occurred is unclear but also as robustness tests. Furthermore, in 
testing hypothesis 3, which is the influence of a novelty on either an IPO or an acquisition, 




by an exit through a non-focal method. In this paper, startups successfully exit through one 
of two methods, an IPO and an acquisition. When testing the effect of novelty on one of 
the exit methods, the other exit method hinders the observation and/or the occurrence of 
the exit method of interest. In Cox PH models, startups exiting through the non-focal 
method are treated as a right-hand censor caused by a missing observation. If an acquisition 
and an IPO are uncorrelated events, then the independent censoring assumption will be 
fulfilled, and the Cox PH models will generate unbiased estimates. Startups that exit 
through an acquisition (IPO), however, would have also been more likely to exit through 
an IPO (acquisition) had the acquisition (IPO) not been possible. Also, the first exit method 
might have a treatment effect on the probability of exit through another method.  For 
example, startups that successfully exit through an IPO have a higher probability of exit 
through acquisition (Fuller and Rothaermel, 2012).  
To solve the problem of a censored observation resulting from a correlated exit 
method, this paper adopts the competing risk model that uses a sub-distribution hazard to 
adjust the estimations. In this method, the sub-distribution hazard model directly provides 
an estimated probability of exit through the focal method for startups that exit through the 
non-focal method.  In other words, startups that experience a competing exit method remain 
in the observation set and risk exiting with an adjusted hazard function; however, they are 
no longer at a risk of exiting through the method of interest. 
3.4 Results and Analysis 
Table 2 presents estimates of the hazard of a successful exit as a function of the 
characteristics of a startup. The general results from the table show that the novelty of an 




startup. The negative effect of a novelty is consistent at both the subclass and subgroup 
levels. Furthermore, the influence at the subgroup level is more stable and larger in scale.  
Table 3.2 - Effect of Novelty on a Successful Exit: Cox Models 
 Novel at Subclass Level  Novel at Subgroup Level  All Novel  
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 









-0.182 -0.185  -0.188 -0.2 -0.214    
Novel 
(subgroup) 

























 0E+00 -8E-10   -9E-10 -1E-09  -9E-10 -1E-09 
Founding Year 
Dummies 
  Yes    Yes   Yes 
          
Founder 
Inventor 
  -0.217    -0.194   -0.196 
 
  -0.178    -0.178   -0.178 
Team Size 
Dummies 
  Yes    Yes   Yes 
Entrepreneuri
al Experience 
  0.21    0.218   0.221 
  -0.164    -0.164   -0.164 
Industry 
Experience 
  0.0417    0.0275   0.015 
  -0.324    -0.32   -0.323 
Ph.D. Degree   0.213    0.222   0.217 
 
  -0.211    -0.213   -0.214 
Location Dummies  Yes    Yes   Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes    Yes   Yes 
Years 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 




31.64 158.53   20.83 30.77 137.19   32.07 152.39 





For both proxies at the subclass and subgroup levels, the smaller the value, the more 
novel the innovation is. As the results reported in Table 2 show relative risk ratios, a 
positive coefficient of a novelty represents a negative effect on a successful exit. In 
columns 1 and 4, which include only year dummies as controls for the macro environment 
each year, novelty at the subclass level is negative but not significant while novelty at the 
subgroup level is negative and significant (p<0.01). When we add the amount of external 
funding received by the startups as a control, the results of which are shown in columns 2 
and 5, the negative effect increased in scale and became significant at the subclass level. 
This phenomenon sheds light on the potential role of external financing, especially that 
from VCs, in the success of the exit of startups that might come from both a selection effect 
(only high-quality novel innovations are financed) and a treatment effect (improves the 
prospects for funded innovates).   
The coefficients remain comparatively stable when we add other control variables. 
Columns 1 to 3 show the results of novelty at the subclass level. Because all novel 
innovations at the subgroup level are novel at the subclass level, in the models in columns 
4 to 6, we add in novelty at the subclass level as a control so the coefficient at the subgroup 
level is the pure effect of novelty at the subgroup level. Columns 7 and 8, in which we did 
not add in the novelty at the subclass level, show that the coefficient at the subgroup level 
represents the overall effect of novelty at both the subclass and subgroup levels. Based on 
the results, the probability of a successful exit of a startup with an absolute novel innovation 
at the subclass level is 40% lower than that of a startup with a non-novel innovation.  At 
the subgroup level, a one standard- deviation increase in novelty reduces the probability of 
a successful exit by around 65%. When we account for all types of novelty, the 
disadvantage of being novel leads to a 68% lower probability of a successful exit. We use 




4 in Table 4. The coefficients of the logit models are consistent with the results of the 
survival analysis but relatively larger in scale.  
We draw cumulative survivor functions from estimates of the Cox model. In Figure 
3, the blue line represents the baseline survivor function. We use the coefficient of full 
novelty to calculate the scale factor to obtain the survivor function for startups with pure 
conventional innovations and novel innovations. The figure shows that novelty has a 
persistent negative effect on a successful exit and the effect increases with time. To show 
the effect of novelty on a successful exit more clearly, we draw hazard functions, shown in 
Figure 4, we mark startups with a novel innovation above the average sample value as the 
treatment group and the remaining startups as the control group. We run the full Cox model 
but replace the proxy of novelty by a treatment dummy and estimate the hazard functions 
for the firms in the treatment and control groups, the results of which are shown in Figure 
4.  The results show a lasting and increasing negative effect of novelty.  
 
Figure 3.3 - The survival function of baseline startups, startups with conventional 





Figure 3.4 - The hazard function (exit probability) for startups with novel innovations 
and conventional innovations. 
Table 3 shows estimates of the probability of forming alliances. Because firms may 
have more than one alliance, we use logit models when the dependent variable is an alliance 
dummy and negative binomial models when the dependent variable is the number of 
alliances. Columns 1 to 4 in Table 3 reports the results of the logit models and Columns 5 
to 8 report the results of the negative binomial models.  
The decreased novelty of an innovation increases the probability of forming 
alliances. Columns 1 to 8 show that this finding remains consistent. Having novel 
innovations not only decreases the probability of forming alliances (Columns 1 to 4) but 
also reduces the number of alliances (Columns 5 to 8). These results also have high 
economic significance: Compared to startups with the most novel innovations, startups 
with the most conventional innovations have a higher likelihood of forming alliances of 
250%. The mean value of the number of alliances for startups is 2.6, and having 




230%. The results in Table 3 also show that having VC funding increases the likelihood of 
forming initial alliances and further alliances, results consistent with those in Ozmel et al. 
(2012). 
Table 3.3 - Effect of Novelty on Alliances: Logit and Negative Binomial Models 
  Logit Models   Negative Binomial Models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Number Number Number Number   Dummy Dummy Dummy Dummy 
Novelty 
(subgroup) 
0.698 1.703** 1.742** 1.512*  0.319 1.637** 1.553** 1.454** 














 1.-09* 1e-09* 1e-09*   1e-09* 1e-09* 1e-09* 
Founding Year 
Dummies 
  Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
         
Founder 
Inventor 
  0.307 0.644    -0.1 0.149 
  -0.319 -0.341    -0.311 -0.294 
Team Size 
Dummies 
  Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
         
Entrepreneurial 
Experience 
  -0.034 0.092    0.269 0.286 
  -0.281 -0.296    -0.271 -0.255 
Industry 
Experience 
  0.356 0.597    0.301 0.43 
  -0.573 -0.606    -0.558 -0.519 
Ph.D. Degree   0.446 0.0679    0.383 0.204  
  -0.394 -0.421    -0.379 -0.371 
Location Dummies   Yes     Yes 
Industry Dummies   Yes     Yes 
N 408 408 408 408   408 408 408 408 
chi2 1.9 56.87 66.85 89.98   0.33 70.05 76.72 112.19 
*P<0.05 **P<0.01 ***P<0.001               
 
Table 4 shows how novelty and the formation of alliance influence the probability of 




results of corresponding models with alliances. They show that having alliances increases 
the probability of a successful exit. Once we control for the founding team information, the 
positive effect of alliances dramatically decreased, which indicates that the formation of 
alliances is under the influence of the founding team.  It may be that startups with stronger 
founding teams are more adept at forming alliances.  It is also possible that a strong 
founding team partially substitutes for the positive effect resulting from the formation of 
forming alliances.  
The coefficients of novelty listed in columns 5 to 8 are systematically smaller in scale 
than the coefficients of novelty listed in columns 1 to 4, indicating that the negative effect 
of novelty, in part, is the result of the difficulty of forming alliances. The difference in the 
coefficients is robust to the alternative measure of using an alliance dummy to replace the 
number of alliances. Although the negative effect of novelty is smaller in models that 
controlled the number of alliances, the scale differences are not very large, indicating that 
novelty exacerbates the formation of alliances, and the lack of alliances reduces the 
likelihood of a successful exit; the formation of alliances, however, accounts for very little 
of the effect of novelty on a successful exit. One explanation for this finding is that many 
startups with novel innovations that were unable to get complementary resources through 
alliances gain access to complementary resources through alternative sources. In general, 
the results shown in Tables 3 and 4 support hypothesis 2—that alliance formation partially 
mediates the negative association between novelty and a successful exit. 






  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Exit Exit Exit Exit  Exit Exit Exit Exit 
Novelty 
(subgroup) 
1.076* 1.038* 1.633** 1.787***  1.001* 0.933* 1.496** 1.677** 
-0.434 -0.453 -0.505 -0.518  -0.444 -0.462 -0.512 -0.524 
Alliances      1.011*** 0.979*** 0.622* 0.642*  


























         
Founding Year 
Dummies 
  Yes Yes    Yes Yes 










  -0.272 -0.278    -0.273 -0.28 
Team Size 
Dummies 
  Yes Yes    Yes Yes 
         
Entrepreneurial 
Experience 
  0.423 0.401    0.444 0.411 
  -0.238 -0.242    -0.24 -0.244 
Industry 
Experience 
  -0.589 -0.55    -0.626 -0.604 
  -0.499 -0.507    -0.501 -0.509 
Ph.D. Degree   0.496 0.359    0.448 0.34  
  -0.317 -0.332    -0.318 -0.333 
Location Dummies   Yes     Yes 
Industry Dummies   Yes     Yes 
N 408 408 408 408   408 408 408 408 
chi2 6.26 19.2 76.49 84.71   23.4 34.75 81.32 89.42 
*P<0.05 **P<0.01 ***P<0.001               
 
In our sample, because we only count either IPO or acquisition, they are competing 
exit modes.  Indeed, startups that existed by an IPO were acquired later than those that 
exited by acquisition, and startups that were acquired might have been able to go public if 




we use competing risk models to coordinate the right censor problem caused by the non-
focal exit mode.  
In Table 5, we report the results of the competing risk model that examines the effect 
of novelty on acquisition. The coefficient of the full model in column 6 indicates that the 
probability of a successful exit for startups with conventional innovations is about 170% 
higher (p<0.05) than that of startups with novel innovations, which indicates that novelty 
has a negative effect on an exit through acquisition. The coefficient of novelty is 
consistently negative but not significant in models with a control of location and/or in the 
industry of the startups, showing that the effect of novelty on acquisition might vary within 
an industry or region.  Therefore, the external commercialization environment might 
influence the relationship between novelty and acquisition. After we control for all internal 





Table 3.5 - Effect of Novelty on Acquisition: Competing Risk Models 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ACQ ACQ ACQ ACQ ACQ ACQ 
Novelty 
0.657 0.68 0.677 0.667 0.797* 1.002* 
-0.376 -0.379 -0.378 -0.382 -0.391 -0.414 
Log (Funding)  0.386** 0.466** 0.429** 0.467** 0.499*** 
 
 -0.13 -0.158 -0.151 -0.157 -0.15 
Founding  Year 
Dummies 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Founder Inventor    -0.0457 -0.0044 -0.075 
 
   -0.196 -0.197 -0.208 
Team Size 
Dummies 
   Yes Yes Yes 
Entrepreneurial 
Experience 
   0.236 0.286 0.192 
   -0.19 -0.19 -0.191 
Industry 
Experience 
   -0.397 -0.431 -0.473 
   -0.367 -0.376 -0.389 
Ph.D. Degree    0.199 0.185 0.256 
 
   -0.25 -0.246 -0.25 
Location Dummies    Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies     Yes 
N 408 408 408 408 408 408 
chi2 5 9.42 13.95 18.56 37.83 123.47 
*P<0.05 **P<0.01 
***P<0.001 
          
 
Table 6 presents estimates of the hazard of exit through an IPO as a function of 
novelty and other control variables. In general, the effect of novelty on the probability of 
an IPO exit is unclear. The coefficients are negative and large on an economic scale but 
not statistically significant because of the large variance. This phenomenon indicates that 




effect might be negative, some cases could be extremely successful, which explains why 
VCs have a strong incentive to invest in startups with novel innovations.   
Table 3.6 - Effect of Novelty on an IPO: Competing Risk Models 
       
Table 6: Effect of Novelty on an IPO: Competing Risk Models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  IPO IPO IPO IPO IPO IPO 
Novelty 
1.007 0.942 1.089 1.106 1.102 0.717 
-0.539 -0.531 -0.587 -0.57 -0.565 -0.532 
Log (Funding)  0.384** 0.460** 0.423** 0.460** 0.487** 
 
 -0.138 -0.161 -0.153 -0.158 -0.151 
Founding Year 
Dummies 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Founder 
Inventor 





   -0.262 -0.262 -0.265 
Team Size 
Dummies 
   Yes Yes Yes 
Entrepreneurial 
Experience 
   0.0737 0.141 0.184 
   -0.258 -0.266 -0.266 
Industry 
Experience 
   -0.0299 -0.0135 0.00831 
   -0.383 -0.389 -0.4 
Ph.D. Degree    0.289 0.277 -0.248 
 
   -0.359 -0.371 -0.402 
Location Dummies    Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies     Yes 
N 408 408 408 408 408 408 
chi2 4.92 10.17 18.82 60.55 121.45 138.85 





To test the large variance in the performance of startups with novel innovations, we 
collected the IPO market values of startups that exited through an IPO from Yahoo Finance. 
We divided the sample, consisting of 83 startups that exited through an IPO, into a high 
novelty group and a low novelty group based on the proportion of novel combinations in 
the subgroup.  The average IPO market value for firms with high novel innovation was 
$73.6 million and the corresponding value for the low novelty group was 54.4 million, a 
statistically significant difference. These value differences mainly stem from a few extreme 
value observations in the high novel group.  Figure 5 shows the value distribution of the 
two groups and Figure 6 the estimated Kernal density distribution of the IPO values. The 
figures show that the value distribution of the high novel group has a long tail and the 
average value for startups with a novel innovation is slightly higher. This sample illustrates 
that when successful, a novel innovation will generate extreme value.  
 





Figure 3.6 - Estimated Kernel density 
This study explored the robustness of the principal results by using the Cox PH 
models and multinomial logit models to test the effect novelty has on exit modes. The 
results are available upon request. Although the coefficients of the multinomial logit 
models are large in scale than those of the Cox and competing risk models, the coefficients 
of the Cox and multi-logit models are consistent with those found by the competing risk 
models. One explanation for this difference is that multinomial logit models, which are 
cross sectional, are unable to control the effect of time-varying external factors. The scale 
differences are generated by the influences of external factors. Another explanation is that 
all of these models generate maximum likelihood estimates and are sample-specific results. 
When the sample size is large, the differences among the models will converge, which is 
not the case in this paper. Overall, however, the robustness tests support that finding that 





This article examined how the novelty of an innovation influences the performance 
of a startup, which is expressed as a successful exit through either acquisition or an IPO, 
and how this influence, in limited scale, stems from the effect of novel innovation on the 
formation of alliances. To identify the effects, we assembled comprehensive data on over 
400 healthcare startups that received external financing between 1990 and 2010, drawing 
on several data sources: CrunchBase, USPTO Patent Views, the USPTO Trademark 
Database, Linked-in, Bloomberg, Thomson SDC platinum, and Yahoo Finance. We 
hypothesized that because of the high risk and market uncertainty associated with the 
commercialization process of a novel technological innovation, startups with such an 
innovation have a lower probability of a successful exit. We found that this negative effect 
partially stems from the difficulty startups with novel innovations have forming alliances. 
We also found that an IPO is the more likely exit mode for startups with novel innovations. 
All three hypotheses are supported by empirical tests. 
The results of this study have several implications for research on strategy and 
entrepreneurship of technology startups.  For one, our paper is the first to test how the 
novelty of innovation influences the performance and financial returns of high-tech 
startups, which provides empirical evidence that the attributes of innovation have a 
persistent influence on the commercialization process.  This work also contributes to the 
entrepreneurship literature by testing how technology attributes may influence the 
application of commercialization strategies for high-tech startups and how the application 
of a particular commercialization strategy affects the performance of a firm. In addition, 
our study has improved the measurement of novelty, which provides a useful 
methodological tool for future researchers interested in examining the effects of novelty. 
Although we used several models to conduct robustness checks and obtained 




limitations that need to be acknowledged.  One is the potential issue of endogeneity. It 
usually takes three to six years before a startup exits, during which time it is under the 
influence of both time-variant and -invariant variables. For the time-invariant variables, 
although this paper added founding team variables, industry dummies, and founding year 
dummies to control for the persistent imbalance of commercialization capabilities that may 
relate to technology attributes, other factors such as the social network of founders and 
inventors may simultaneously influence the novelty of innovation, the formation of 
alliances, and the performance of firms.  
For the time-variant factors, this paper added year dummies in the form of a time-
variant scale factor to control for external conditions such as the financial market and 
macroeconomic situations.  Nevertheless, we have not controlled for the strategic choices 
of firms, which may be inspired by their innovations and influence their performance. 
Although the issue of omitted variables may have created noise in the results, we found no 
indication that it would lead to biased results. Perhaps future research could apply a more 
accurate test to a dataset with all the required variables. 
Another potential limitation of this paper is the generalizability of its results to other 
industries.  Numerous studies have analyzed how the environment of an industry and the 
existence of a market for technology may influence the commercialization strategy and 
performance of a startup. Our paper is specific to healthcare industries, all of which have a 
comparable technological environment characterized by high intellectual property 
protection, intense competition, and high risk. It is likely that novelty will have a similar 
effect on industries that share the characteristics of healthcare industries.  In industries 
whose environments differ, however, researchers could find a fertile area in which to 
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CHAPTER 4. THE MODERATING EFFECT OF EDUCATION 
ON SERIAL ENTREPRENERUSHIP PERFORMANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
Firms founded by serial entrepreneurs7 who enhance their capabilities and 
accumulated resources from their past entrepreneurial experience perform, on average, 
better than firms founded by novice entrepreneurs (Eesley and Roberts, 2012; Gompers, 
Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfsterin, 2010; Lafontaine and Shaw, 2016; Paik, 2014; Parker, 
2013; Toft-Kehler, Wennberg, and Kim, 2014). The performance of serial entrepreneurs, 
however, varies dramatically. Chen (2013) graphically analyzed the earning distributions 
of serial entrepreneurs and one-time entrepreneurs and showed a similar variance between 
the distributions of the two groups.  Nielsen and Sarasvathy (2016) pointed out that the 
market for serial entrepreneurs is a market for lemons because of the excessive entry of 
entrepreneurs with low expectations of their performance. As the performance of serial 
entrepreneurs varies significantly, the identification of individuals from a divergent pool 
of serial entrepreneurs who will perform more successfully in their follow-on startups 
raises a critical question for entrepreneurs, investors, and policymakers.  
To address the heterogeneity of the performance of serial entrepreneurs, which is 
expressed as the variation in the relationship between entrepreneurial experience and firm 
performance among individuals, a stream of research has tested the moderating factors 
affect this relationship. Assuming that improved performance depends on the similarities 
                                                 
7In this paper, serial entrepreneurs are sequential entrepreneurs that have found a subsequent venture only 
after leaving their previous one.  This definition is similar to the definitions found in Park (2014) and 




between current and former ventures, several papers have detected moderating factors from 
the content, context, and time domains and found that the results of former ventures 
(Eggers and Song, 2014), industry similarities (Lafontaine and Shaw, 2016; Toft-Kehler, 
Wennberg, and Kim, 2014), temporal similarities (Parker, 2013; Rocha, Carneiro, and 
Varum, 2015; Toft-Kehler, Wennberg, and Kim, 2014), and geographic similarities (Toft-
Kehler, Wennberg, and Kim, 2014) are factors that are positively associated with the 
relationship between entrepreneurial experience and follow-on firm performance. These 
factors, which describe similarities among ventures from various domains, are external 
variables.  
Although external factors influence the performance of serial entrepreneurs, it is the 
heterogeneity of individuals that plays a more critical role in determining the performance 
of serial entrepreneurs (Rocha, Carneiro, and Varum, 2015; Nielsen and Sarasvathy, 2016). 
Therefore, investigating individual characteristics that influence the performance of serial 
entrepreneurs is theoretically feasible and important. Numerous papers that relate to 
occupational choice have found that education (Lucas, 1978; Jovanovic, 1994), risk 
preferences (Barton, 2000), skill diversification (Lazear, 2002), and financial condition 
(Evans and Jovanovic, 1989) are characteristics influencing the entrance of individuals into 
entrepreneurship and their performance. The extent to which these characteristics influence 
serial entrepreneurship in a dynamic process has not been well studied.  
Several studies have noted the strong influence of education on entrepreneurial 
performance.  In addition to Lucas (1978), numerous papers have theoretically and 
empirically studied the relationship between formal education and entrepreneurial 
outcomes (Van Der Sluis, Praag, and Vijverberg, 2008). This stream of research has found 
that formal schooling is linked to stronger entrepreneurial capability, so it is positively 




performance (Van Der Sluis, Praag, and Vijverberg, 2008). Recent studies of serial 
entrepreneurship used education as a control variable to test entrepreneurial experience and 
performance and found a positive effect of education on firm performance across all 
ventures (Chen, 2013; Lafontaine and Shaw, 2016; Parker, 2013; Rocha, Carneiro, and 
Varum, 2015; Toft-Kehler, Wennberg, and Kim, 2014). The results of these papers, 
however, not only varied with regard to the extent of the effect of education but also 
differed significantly with regard to the main effect of entrepreneurial experience and 
entrepreneurial performance.8  These findings indicate that the relationship between 
education and serial entrepreneurship is much more complex, not a simple positive one 
found by existing literature.  
This paper explores the influence of education on the performance of serial 
entrepreneurs from a dynamic perspective. The performance of serial entrepreneurs is 
mainly influenced by both the entrepreneurial learning-by-doing (LBD) process and the 
self-selection process (Chen, 2013; Rocha et al., 2015; Nielsen and Sarasvathy, 2016).  
Following this framework, we investigate the effect of education on serial entrepreneurship 
performance via its influence on the entrepreneurial LBD and self-selection processes.  
Our analysis suggests that a stronger learning ability and a broader knowledge base, 
both associated with more education, allow individuals to learn more from their 
entrepreneurial experience. Such knowledge facilitates the follow-on entrepreneurial LBD 
process and expands the gap between individuals with more education and those with less 
education.  Thus, education has a moderating effect on the entrepreneurial LBD process.  
                                                 
8For example, using a sample of MIT alumni, Eesley and Roberts (2012) found that one more 
entrepreneurial experience increased the financial performance by more than 50%.  However, in another 
study using a sample of incorporated retail stores in Texas, Lafontaine and Shaw (2014) found a weaker 
positive relationship than that found by Eesley and Roberts (2012).  In addition, testing in NLS79, in which 
sample entrepreneurship included self-employment, Chen (2013) found that the entrepreneurial learning-




At the same time, because they have better outside employment opportunities, individuals 
with more education experience a stronger selection effect when they enter serial 
entrepreneurship than those with less education. We test our hypothesis using a sample of 
entrepreneurs selected from NLS97, a representative sample of the U.S. population. The 
results show that education positively moderates the relationship between entrepreneurial 
experience and venture performance and this moderation effect originates from both the 
entrepreneurial LBD and self-selection processes. Entrepreneurs with more education, 
indeed, learn more from the same amount of entrepreneurial experience and are more likely 
to exit entrepreneurship through an efficient self-selection process if they have a lower 
entrepreneurial capability.  
Contributing to the literature on serial entrepreneurship, this study is part of the 
growing body of research identifying the factors that explain the individual heterogeneity 
of the relationship between entrepreneurial experience and venture performance (Eggers 
and Song, 2014; Lafontaine and Shaw, 2016; Rocha, Carneiro, and Varum, 2015; Toft-
Kehler, Wennberg, and Kim, 2014; Parker, 2013). Complementing former studies that have 
examined external factors, this paper studies how education, as an individual characteristic, 
might moderate the focal relationship. The results of this paper provide insights into a new 
perspective that acknowledges the importance of individual characteristics and thus 
contribute to the ongoing discussion.  
4.2 Theory Construction 
The relationship between entrepreneurial experience and venture performance is the 
joint effect of both the entrepreneurial LBD and self-selection effects. The LBD that takes 
place within the context of entrepreneurship is a process in which entrepreneurs acquire 




entrepreneurship activities, which enhances venture performance (Politis, 2005). 
Entrepreneurship and employment are substitutable career choices. For entrepreneurs, 
especially serial ones, the decision to set up a current business is a result of the self-
selection process. Self-selection into a current venture by serial entrepreneurs is influenced 
by both intrinsic and extrinsic conditions related to venture performance. Since the 
performance of those that choose to exit an entrepreneurial venture are not observable, the 
final observed relationship between entrepreneurial experience and venture performance 
stems from a biased sample under the influence of self-selection. Thus, this project 
analyzes the effect of education on serial entrepreneurship performance from the influence 
of both LBD and self-selection.  
4.2.1 Education and Entrepreneurial Learning-by-Doing  
The positive relationship between an individual’s aggregated entrepreneurial 
experience and new venture performance mainly originates from the entrepreneurial LBD 
effect (Politis, 2005). The entrepreneurial LBD process is experiential in nature (Politis, 
2005). During this process, entrepreneurs create generalizable knowledge from their 
entrepreneurial experience and apply it to their follow-on ventures, which enjoy enhanced 
performance. When a task is complex, however, knowledge generation and transformation 
processes become more difficult (Kolb, 1984). As no two ventures are the same, 
entrepreneurs will encounter a unique set of challenges every time they start a new venture. 
The differences among ventures create challenges for effective knowledge generation and 
application, that is, entrepreneurial LBD (Kolb, 1984; Toft-Kehler et al., 2014). Therefore, 
only generalizable knowledge, which an entrepreneur can apply in a new entrepreneurial 
context to improve venture performance, is the valuable result of LBD, which effectively 




In light of such challenges, strong absorptive capacity, which depends on an 
individual’s learning ability and knowledge base, could facilitate entrepreneurial LBD 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Because education is positively associated with learning 
ability and knowledge storage, those with more education, who are stronger at knowledge 
generation and transformation, are expected have a stronger entrepreneurial LBD effect 
and generate more entrepreneurial knowledge with the same amount of entrepreneurial 
experience. The generated entrepreneurial knowledge is both the output of past 
entrepreneurial experience and the input of the current learning process. More generated 
entrepreneurial knowledge will facilitate the entrepreneurial LBD of those who are well-
educated  and further expand the gap between them and less-educated individuals. 
Therefore, the average difference between the performance of firms run by well-educated 
and less-educated entrepreneurs increases as the amount of entrepreneurial experience 
increases, and this relationship is potentially positively moderated by education.  
The above deduction is based on an assumption that the amount of knowledge worth 
learning is sufficient for all entrepreneurs. Some scholars have taken an interest in cases in 
which individuals with more education are already equipped with all or a majority of the 
knowledge they need to establish a firm while others are not. Thus, less educated 
individuals, who have more to learn, will exhibit a stronger LBD effect.  The empirical 
results of prior studies, however, have shown that samples composed of a large proportion 
of entrepreneurs with strong educational backgrounds are more likely to exhibit a stronger 
LBD effect than samples with a considerable number of less educated individuals.9 
                                                 
9For example, Eesley and Roberts (2012), analyzing a sample of MIT alumni, found a positive learning 
effect of over 70% while Chen (2013) analyzed a dynamic sample of serial self-employed individuals and 




Therefore, cases of interest are less likely to change the direction of the moderating effects 
stemming from education, which leads to our following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Individuals with more education experience a stronger learning-by-doing 
effect than those with less education, which contributes to the positive moderation effect 
that education has on the relationship between the entrepreneurial experience and stronger 
financial performance of an entrepreneurial venture.  
 
4.2.2 Education and Re-enter into Entrepreneurship  
Apart from the stronger learning-by-doing effect, the moderation effect of education 
also originates from its influence on serial entrepreneurship. Numerous papers in the past 
have theoretically and empirically studied the factors that influence entrepreneurship. 
Although a number of studies have identified factors positively associated with an 
individual’s probability of pursuing entrepreneurship—individual capability (Lucas, 1978; 
Astebro, Chen, and Thompson, 2008), innovativeness (Schumpeter, 1934; Holmes and 
Schmitz, 1990), risk-tolerance (Knight, 1921; Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn, 2009), the 
property of Jacks-of-all-trades (Lazear, 2002; Wagner, 2006), and wealth (Evans and 
Jovanovic, 1989), few have examined the factors influencing entrepreneurs’ decisions to 
re-enter an entrepreneurial venture after an initial venture. In this paper, we analyze the 
role education plays in serial entrepreneurship and how it not only explains the formation 
of a market of “lemons” in serial entrepreneurship but also influences the relationship 
between entrepreneurship experience and firm performance.  
One of the biggest differences between individuals’ entrance into serial 
entrepreneurship is that the decision is made with more information about their 
entrepreneurial efficiency. During an entrepreneurial experience, individuals passively 




information about the external entrepreneurship environment, all of which jointly 
contribute to a more accurate evaluation of their entrepreneurial efficiency (Jovanovic, 
1982).  Although many factors, such as the quality of the opportunity and managerial 
experience, are generally positively related to the entrepreneurial opportunity and could be 
used to assess its prospects, concise knowledge of one’s entrepreneurial efficiency is 
unknown before that individual becomes an entrepreneur. This situation fosters the 
phenomenon of the excess entry of entrepreneurs, which leads to the high entry and high 
failure rates of startups in almost all industries (Hogarth and Karelaia, 2002). Once 
individuals understand their entrepreneurship efficiency, they will compare the tradeoff 
between self-employment and working for others and reenter an entrepreneurial venture 
only if the expected utility of self-employment is higher than the utility of being employed.  
The effect of education on entrepreneurial efficiency and its value in the job market 
value show little correlation.  Based on Lazear (2002), the job market value of individuals 
is associated with their best skills while entrepreneurial efficiency is limited by their 
weakest attributes. Just as the majority of high-school students do not have a major while 
college students do, the higher the education is, the more specialized the training is. 
Therefore, education may not only enhance one’s overall capability but also augment some 
of the specialized skills of that individual at a faster rate, which indicates that education 
enhances their job market value much faster than it does their entrepreneurial efficiency. 
As entrepreneurs make re-entry decisions by comparing the utility of self-employment and 
that of being employed by others, education leads to greater external job-market 
opportunities and entrepreneurial efficiency for re-entry. As a result, well-educated 
entrepreneurs experience a stronger selection effect than less-educated entrepreneurs in the 




Because individuals in the two tails of the ability distribution are more likely to 
experience job market friction and enter entrepreneurship, the ability distribution of first-
time entrepreneurs has fatter tails (Astebro, Chen, and Thompson, 2011). After passively 
learning their entrepreneurial efficiency, well-educated entrepreneurs with a greater 
likelihood of re-entering entrepreneurship are more likely to select out of entrepreneurship. 
Therefore, the market of serial entrepreneurs contains a disproportionate number of low-
ability individuals. This deduction is consistent with the empirical findings of Nielsen and 
Saravathy (2016), who found that the serial entrepreneurship market a market for lemons 
caused by a strong Type II error and a weak Type I error; in other words, too many low 
ability individuals with a small chance of success mistakenly re-enter serial 
entrepreneurship while those most likely to succeed do not.  An explanation for this 
phenomenon is the divergent effect of education on the selection of serial entrepreneurship.  
As the above analysis shows, the external job-market favors more educated people, 
which indicates greater entrepreneurial utility for self-selected re-entry, the result of which 
is a positive relationship between education and venture performance. However, the self-
selection process, which takes place simultaneously with the passive learning process, is 
gradual and progresses as individuals participate in entrepreneurial activities. Since the 
passive learning process is more effective during an individual’s first several ventures 
(Jovanovic, 1982; Kim, Aldrich, and Keister, 2006), the self-selection effect decreases as 
entrepreneurial experience accumulates. That is, the selection effect of education positively 
moderates the relationship between entrepreneurial experience and venture performance, 
but the moderating effect decreases with time. Thus, we posit the following: 
Hypothesis 2: More highly educated individuals make better decisions with regard to 
serial entrepreneurship, which contributes to the positive moderation effect education has 
on the relationship between entrepreneurial experience and stronger financial 





Because the moderation effect of education originates from its positive influence on 
the entrepreneurial LBD process and the self-selection process, we predict that the overall 
moderation effect of education on the relationship between entrepreneurial experience and 
firm performance will also be positive. Thus, we posit the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Education has a positive moderation effect on the relationship between 
entrepreneurial experience and the financial performance of an entrepreneurial venture.  
 
4.3 Empirical Setting 
4.3.1 Sample 
The sample of this paper consists of 9,704 observations from 2,928 entrepreneurs 
surveyed in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLS97). The NLS97 
contains information about 8,984 individuals selected from 96,517 U.S. households, a 
process that ensures that the distribution of the 8,984 individuals represents the U.S. 
population with regard to major demographic characteristics. (The large variance of 
individuals facilitated our testing of the moderation effect of education on serial 
entrepreneurship.) NLS97 collected and recorded the employment information of 
individuals in 17 rounds of surveys that covered a period of 19 years beginning in 1997. 
The first survey sampled the individuals when they were 12 to 17 years old. The continuous 
tracking of work experiences in this longitudinal study recorded successive changes in the 
individuals’ employment status that began when they entered the workforce, which not 
only provided a sufficient number of entrepreneurs but also allowed the tracking of serial 




Entrepreneurship is broadly defined as people who work for themselves. 
Approximately a third of individuals in NLS97 had at least one entrepreneurship 
experience. As distinguishing the entrepreneurial income of multiple ventures established 
in the same survey year was virtually impossible, we deleted a handful of entrepreneurs 
who had established more than one venture in any survey year. After deleting several 
hundred entrepreneurs with missing data on core variables (e.g., highest degree, 
entrepreneurship income), the sample of this paper consisted of 2,928 entrepreneurs, 1,776 
of whom had only one entrepreneurial experience, 686 two, 300 three, 112  four, and 54 
five or more. These individuals were comparable on the highest degrees, but the number 
of total ventures was negatively associated with annual entrepreneurship income. The data 
statistics of key variables by each entrepreneurship group are presented in Table 1.  
Table 4.1 - Entrepreneurship Summary 
 
# of Ventures 
# of 
Individuals 
Years of Managerial 
Experience 
log( Entrepreneurial 
income) log( Salary) 
Highest 
Degree 
1 1776 0.3384009 9.44333 8.313338 1.28491 
2 686 0.2463557 9.339978 8.124914 1.344023 
3 300 0.1333333 9.142507 8.010294 1.383333 
4 112 0.0625 9.078746 7.84201 1.419643 
5 32 0.375 8.535593 7.855028 1.5625 
6 14 0.3571429 9.188048 8.483428 1.285714 
7 4 0 8.413118 8.431369 2 
8 3 0 7.941757 4.996323 1.666667 
12 1 0 10.30899 9.954133 1 
 
4.3.2 Variables 
The dependent variable used in this paper is the financial performance of the new 




income is the sum of the draw, or the amount of money withdrawn in the form of a salary, 
and retained earnings, or the amount of reported profit of the business (Hamilton, 2000). 
NLS97 does not provide a measure of the amount of income reinvested by entrepreneurs 
to expand their businesses, so the entrepreneurial income in this paper is measured as the 
sum of salaries and profits. Because entrepreneurial income is severely skewed on the 
right-hand side, we took the natural log of entrepreneurial income, as many other 
researchers have done.  
The independent variable in this paper is the measure of entrepreneurial experience 
and education. In this paper, entrepreneurial experience is measured as the number of 
ventures and the years of entrepreneurial experience, and education is measured as the 
highest degree attained by that entrepreneur. Because ventures vary in their survival time, 
we add in the “years of entrepreneurial experience” as a complementary independent 
variable to the widely used variable “number of ventures” and use it as a robustness test in 
the major models. The highest degree attained is a four-level categorical variable that 
equals 3 for individuals with a graduate degree, 2 for those with a college degree, 1 for 
those with a high-school diploma, and 0 for all others. 
We target the control variables of this paper to eliminate potential endogeneity from 
factors that simultaneously influence the education of an entrepreneur, the selection to enter 
an entrepreneurial venture, and the performance of the venture. We controlled for 
demographic characteristics (i.e., race, birth year, and gender), family financial conditions 
(i.e., the family’s financial assets when an individual is 20 years old and non-financial 
assets when the individual is 20 years old), individual capabilities (i.e., years of managerial 
experience and annual salary as a worker), and whether the follow-on venture is in the 




1. We acquired accurate values for race, birth year, and gender, but the values for other 
variables contain 10% to 30% missing values that are replaced by the sample mean. 
Table 4.2 - Data Statistics 
 
Variable Mean S.D. n               
Year 2007.61 4.29 9704 




2.13 2.39 9704 
       
# of Ventures 2.04 1.25 9704 
       
Years of Managerial 
Experience 
0.55 1.40 9704 -
0.0651* 
1 
     
Same Industry 
Dummy 
0.46 0.50 9704 0.0226 0.0263 1 
    
Financial Assets 3197.19 17984 9704 0.0294 0.0249 0.016 1 
   
Non-Financial 
Assets 




9.59 1.14 9704 0.0617* 0.1695* 0.1142* 0.0727* 0.0418 1 
 
Log(Salary) 8.02 2.23 9704 -
0.1134* 
0.2042* 0.1226* -0.0057 0.0484* 0.0565* 1 
Birth Year 1981.89 1.38 9704 -
0.0607* 
































Mixed Race 32 
 
# of Individual 
   
2928 
  Non-Black/ Non-
Hispanic 
1615               
 
4.3.3 Empirical Strategy 
Since entrepreneurship activities occur sequentially while all control variables are 
cross-sectional variables, one of the main empirical concerns is heterogeneity across time, 
which is under the influence of the former startup and impacts later performance. Such a 




(GEEs).  While mixed-effect models fit subject-specific models, GEEs fit marginal models, 
so the fitting of GEE is easier and more efficient.  Therefore, as the treatment effect, that 
is, the effect of entrepreneurial experience on firm performance, is of primary interest in 
this paper, we adopt GEEs (Wang, 2014) to test the main effect and use OLS with an 
adjusted standard error and random effect models for a robustness test.  The models 
produce consistent results.  
Among the 2,928 entrepreneurs in this sample, only about 40% (1,152) were serial 
entrepreneurs that established two or more startups, a finding that is consistent with the 
self-selection theory that entrepreneurs make their decisions to re-enter entrepreneurship 
only after their initial entrepreneurial experience and only those with comparatively higher 
entrepreneurial efficiency self-selected to be serial entrepreneurs. Therefore, the results of 
the GEE models represent a joint effect of LBD and self-selection. Although it is 
impossible to separate the effects of self-selection and LBD, the Heckman selection model 
could estimate the effect of self-selection and adjust its influence in the main models to 
report the effect of LBD. The differences between the coefficients of the GEE models and 
the Heckman selection models show the effect of self-selection. 
For more robust identification, the selection equation in the Heckman selection 
model requires an exogeneous variable excluded from the main equation as an exclusion 
restriction. As analyzed in the theoretical section of this paper, education is directly linked 
to the external opportunities of entrepreneurs, which influence the selection to enter serial 
entrepreneurship. One of the most important components of the utility of external 
opportunity is the pecuniary income.  In this project, we use the average annual income10 
                                                 
10The average annual income data were collected from Occupational Employment Statistics that were 




of the job one had immediately before that individual entered entrepreneurship as a proxy 
of the utility external opportunity and use it as an instrument in the selection equation. 
4.4 Results 
Table 3 reports the results of the GEE estimation of the relationship between 
entrepreneurial experience and venture performance as well as the moderating effect of 
education on this relationship. The results of this paper, which illustrate the joint effect of 
entrepreneurial LBD and self-selection, are used to test hypothesis 3.  Entrepreneurial 
experience is measured as the number of ventures in models 1 to 3 and as the years of 
entrepreneurial experience in models 4 to 6.  Models 1 and 4 include the entrepreneurial 
experience only, models 2 and 5 use all control variables, and models 3 and 6 add in the 
interaction term of the independent variable and the degree.  
  
                                                 






Table 4.3 - The Results of Generalized Estimating Equations on Log (Entrepreneurial 
Income) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
# of Ventures 
0.246*** 0.192*** 0.0523    
(0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0275)    
 
      
Years of Entrepreneurial 
Experience 
   0.106*** 0.0863*** 0.0280** 
   (0.00479) (0.00496) (0.00996) 
Highest Degree  
0.0930*** -0.0694*  0.113*** 0.0508* 
 (0.0197) (0.0308)  (0.0209) (0.0230) 
Gender  
-0.339*** -0.338***  -0.328*** -0.329*** 
 (0.0310) (0.0312)  (0.0300) (0.0302) 
Birth Year  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Race  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Managerial Experience  
0.139*** 0.137***  0.116*** 0.111*** 
 (0.00966) (0.00968)  (0.00975) (0.00978) 
Same Industry  
Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Household Financial 
Controls 
 Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
      
Year Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
log(Average Salary)  
0.0578*** 0.0585***  0.0660*** 0.0667*** 
 (0.00686) (0.00693)  (0.00730) (0.00737) 
# of firms * Degree   
0.113***    
  (0.0164)    
# of years * Degree      
0.0452*** 
     (0.00668) 
_cons 9.194*** 9.428*** 9.624*** 9.382*** 9.533*** 9.617*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0698) (0.0778) (0.0175) (0.0656) (0.0671) 
Observations 9704 9704 9704 9704 9704 9704 
Individuals  2928 2928 2928 2928 2928 2928 
Notes: 1. Model 1 to 3 use the number of ventures as the independent variable and model 4 to 6 use 
years of entrepreneurial experience as the independent variable. Model 1 and 4 include the 
independent variables only, model 2 and 5 utilize the full control variables, and model 3 and 6 add in 
the interaction term of the independent variable and the degree. 2. Standard errors in parentheses, 
significance is marked as: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
The results presented in Table 3 show that having one more venture experience, on 




extra year of entrepreneurial experience is 8.6%. After adding the interaction factor, the 
coefficient of entrepreneurial experience decreases markedly and becomes non-significant 
when measured as the number of ventures. The coefficient of the interaction effect of 
education and entrepreneurial experience is significant both economically and statistically, 
which supports the first hypothesis: that education has a positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between the entrepreneurial experience and venture performance.   
Based on the regression results of model 3, we calculated the average marginal 
effects of education and entrepreneurial experience, the results of which are shown in 
Figure 1.  The figure shows that the differences between the effects of education widen as 
entrepreneurial experience increases. In a second venture, the firm performance of 
individuals with a graduate degree is 14% more successful than the sample average and 
that of individuals with high school diplomas is 6% less successful than the sample 
average; none of the coefficients, however, are statistically significant. In the fourth 
venture, the firm performance of individuals with a graduate degree is around 50% more 
successful than the sample average while that of high school dropouts is 60% less 





Figure 4.1 - The marginal effect of education and entrepreneurial experience. 
The independent variable used in this paper, the highest degree attained, is a discrete 
categorical variable with four values. As the moderating effect of education of any two 
consecutive categories might differ, the moderating effect of education tested in this paper 
might be nonlinear. To test the potential nonlinearity effect, we divide the sample into four 
segments based on the highest degree attained by the individuals and separately test the 
relationship between entrepreneurial experience and venture performance for each 
segment, the results of which appear in Table 4. On average, having one more venture will 
enhance firm performance by 12%, 28%, and 37% when an entrepreneur holds a high 
school degree, a college degree, and a graduate degree, respectively. Entrepreneurs who 
dropped out of high school, the least educated in the sample, have an LBD effect of 17% 
from one venture experience. The coefficients of entrepreneurial experience of the four 




the positive relationship between entrepreneurial experience and venture performance is 
positively related to the education of individuals, but the relationship is nonlinear with a 
disturbance by the segments consisting of high school dropouts. The empirical results 
above support hypothesis 3: that education moderates the relationship between 
entrepreneurial experience and venture performance.  
Table 4.4 - The Results of Generalized Estimating Equations on log (Entrepreneurial 
Income) by Education Groups. 
  











# of Ventures 
 0.165*** 0.123*** 0.283*** 0.369*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0181) (0.0251) (0.0536) 
Gender  -0.403*** -0.380*** -0.247*** -0.295* 
  (0.0889) (0.0384) (0.0668) (0.133) 
Birth Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Race  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Managerial 
Experience 
 0.0345 0.109*** 0.149*** 0.205*** 
 (0.0667) (0.0134) (0.0162) (0.0360) 
Same Industry 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
    
Household Financial 
Controls 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
    
log(Average Salary) 
 0.0446** 0.0619*** 0.0394 0.0817 
 (0.0145) (0.00911) (0.0204) (0.0492) 
_cons  9.151*** 9.561*** 9.560*** 10.29*** 
  (0.181) (0.0844) (0.169) (0.361) 
N   935 5428 2652 689 
Notes: 1. Model 1 includes high-school dropouts only, model 2 includes high-school graduates 
only, model 3 includes college graduates only, and model 4 includes people with graduate 







Figure 4.2 - The average effect of one entrepreneurial experience by the various 
education groups in the GEE model. 
The results of the Heckman selection model are listed in Table 5.  As this selection 
model is a two-step model, the results of the main effects are shown in the upper part of 
the table and those of the selection effects are shown in the lower parts. The entrepreneurial 
experience, represented by the number of ventures in models 1 to 5, is measured as years 
of entrepreneurial experience in models 6 to 8.  Models 1 to 3 and 5 to 8 have the same 
variables in the selection model and the main model while models 4 and 5 have the log 
(i.e., external opportunity cost) as the exclusion restriction variable.  












0.044 -0.0970* 0.0441 0.00378







-0.286*** -0.289*** -0.291*** -0.284*** -0.287*** -0.286***
-0.0338 -0.0339 -0.034 -0.0338 -0.0338 -0.0339
Birth Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.173*** 0.170*** 0.180*** 0.167*** 0.166*** 0.174***
-0.0151 -0.0151 -0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0152 -0.0153
0.181*** 0.184*** 0.199*** 0.175*** 0.177*** 0.188***
-0.0377 -0.0377 -0.0379 -0.0377 -0.0377 -0.0378
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.0483*** 0.0484*** 0.0420*** 0.0503*** 0.0504*** 0.0451***





_cons 8.960*** 9.157*** 8.970*** 9.010*** 9.060*** 8.906***
-0.0885 -0.106 -0.0984 -0.0814 -0.0827 -0.0893
Selection 
Model
-0.312*** -0.312*** -0.244*** -0.312*** -0.312*** -0.243***
-0.00614 -0.00614 -0.00536 -0.00614 -0.00614 -0.00532
-0.952*** -0.949*** -0.953*** -0.951***







-0.149*** -0.149*** -0.146*** -0.150*** -0.149*** -0.147***
-0.0399 -0.0398 -0.0371 -0.0399 -0.0398 -0.0371
Birth Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.00674 0.00671 0.0692*** 0.00679 0.00675 0.0688***
-0.016 -0.016 -0.0147 -0.016 -0.016 -0.0147
0.162*** 0.162*** 0.214*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.214***
-0.0437 -0.0436 -0.0407 -0.0437 -0.0437 -0.0408
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
-0.0259** -0.0259** -0.0544*** -0.0259** -0.0259** -0.0542***
-0.00958 -0.00958 -0.00906 -0.00958 -0.00958 -0.00906
0.569*** 0.569*** 0.570*** 0.570***
-0.0205 -0.0204 -0.0204 -0.0204
_cons 2.783*** 2.779*** 2.344*** 2.782*** 2.779*** 2.337***
-0.109 -0.109 -0.108 -0.109 -0.109 -0.108
log-likelihood -9893.246 -9410.062 -9891 -9414.292 -9408.621 -9890.93
N 7317 7317 7317 7317 7317 7317
# of firms * 
Degree
Note: 1. The models in this table use entrepreneurial income as the dependent variable in the main equation 
(top) and the restart as the binary dependent variable in the selection equation (bottom).
2. Model 1 to 3 use number of ventures as the independent variable and model 4 to 6 use years of 
entrepreneurial experience as the independent variable. Model 1 and 4 utilize the full control variables, model 
2 and 5 add in the interaction term of the independent variable and the degree, and model 3 and 6 treat 
degree as a category variable with the group of high-school dropouts as the base.















# of firms * 
Degree
# of years * 
Degree































The effect of education on individuals’ selection to enter serial entrepreneurship is 
negative, and the coefficient is statistically significant and stable across all models. Models 
3 and 8 treated education as a categorical variable, and the results show that the more 
education one has, the less likely that individual will enter serial entrepreneurship. 
Compared to high school dropouts, individuals with a high school degree, a college degree, 
and a graduate school degree are 60%, 130%, and 190% less likely to enter serial 
entrepreneurship. These results are consistent with our theory that more education is 
associated with a stronger self-selection effect.  
In model 5, the coefficient of the exclusion restriction variable is negative, as 
expected, but not significant. This finding indicates that education is positively correlated 
to one’s annual income, but education provides more external utility beyond a higher 
salary. In model 6, in which we drop the highest degree in the selection model, the 
coefficient of the exclusion restriction greatly increases in scale and becomes significant. 
These results indicate that the instrument we use is weak and that the selection stage in the 
Heckman selection model has limited power in controlling the effect of self-selection. 
Therefore, the results show the upper bound of the main effect of LBD. 
The selection model produced several interesting findings. One was that the 
management experience, which is positively related to individuals’ entrepreneurship 
performance, is also negatively related to the selection to enter serial entrepreneurship. This 
finding might explain the formation of the lemon market of serial entrepreneurship.  It 
could also indicate that the managerial experience is another individual characteristic that 
moderates the relationship between entrepreneurial experience and firm performance.  In 
addition, the results of this paper are consistent with the theory that the self-selection effect 




more likely that individual will set up another venture, especially if the next venture is in 
the same industry as the former one.  
The coefficients of the “main effects” are adjusted by the selection effect. Table 3 
shows that models 1 and 2 are comparable to models 2 and 3, and models 6 and 7 are 
comparable to models 5 and 6. These results suggest that the LBD effect of having one 
more entrepreneurial experience improves the financial performance of new ventures by 
8% at most, which is much lower than the results of the GEE model found.  Similarly, 
although significant, the scale of the coefficients of education estimated by the Heckman 
selection models is around 50% of the corresponding models estimated in the GEE model, 
and the moderation effect of education declined to around 30%. The results of the Heckman 
models support Hypothesis 1:  that education has a moderation effect on the entrepreneurial 
LBD process. These results are consistent when the entrepreneurial experience is 
represented by years of entrepreneurial practice. The scale difference between the 
coefficients of the GEE and Heckman Selection models, which indicate that self-selection 
plays an important role in increasing the positive relationship between entrepreneurial 
experience and venture performance and the moderation effect of education, partially stems 
from its influence on the self-selection process, which supports Hypothesis 2.  
To test the potential non-linear moderation effect of education on the entrepreneurial 
LBD process, we also used Heckman selection model in tests of the four separate samples 
that were segmented based on the highest degree of the entrepreneurs, the results of which 
appear in Figure 3.  Compared with the scale of the coefficient in Figure 2, that in Figure 
3 is smaller while the variance is much larger. Similar to the results that do not account for 
the selection effect, the scale of the positive relationship between entrepreneurial 




the relationship, however, is nonlinear. The large variance of the results of the Heckman 
selection model indicates that the positive effect of self-selection on the relationship 
between entrepreneurial experience and firm performance mainly stems from the fact that 
people with potentially low venture performance are selected to exit entrepreneurship. 
Thus, the results generally support hypothesis 2:  that well-educated people experience a 
stronger effect of selection to enter serial entrepreneurship, which contributes to the 
moderation effect of education on the relationship between entrepreneurial experience and 
firm performance.  
 
Figure 4.3 - The average effect of one entrepreneurial experience by the various 
education groups in the Heckman selection model.     




In this study, we explored how education is an individual characteristic that 
moderates the venture performance of serial entrepreneurs, expressed as a positive 
relationship between entrepreneurial experience and venture performance.  As the venture 
performance of a serial entrepreneur is under the influence of both the entrepreneurial 
learning-by-doing (LBD) and self-selection effects, we analyzed the influence of education 
on the focal relationship by its influence on these two processes. Using experiential 
learning theory and Lazear’s occupation choice model, we hypothesized that education 
positively moderates both the LBD and self-selection processes and found that the 
moderating effect of education on the LBD process increases with time while its effect on 
self-selection drops markedly, rapidly converging to zero. The empirical testing indicates 
that education positively moderates the relationship between entrepreneurial experience 
and venture performance. Education influences the self-selection process by effectively 
screening out individuals with low entrepreneurial efficiency.  
The goal of this study was to explore the effect of education on the performance of 
serial entrepreneurs as an important yet understudied topic in the economics of 
entrepreneurship. Using a comprehensive longitudinal dataset, we empirically explored 
how education moderates the relationship between entrepreneurial experience and venture 
performance through its influence on the LBD and self-selection processes. Although this 
study was a macro-level project, the key findings of this paper indicate an interesting 
direction of micro-level research. The independent variable used in this paper, education, 
was a proxy of some micro-level individual factors that directly affect the relationship, 
such as the effect of education on the LBD process reflected by the strong correlation 
between education and learning ability. Therefore, by following this stream of micro-level 




perspective. The value of this paper is that it showed that education, different from learning 
ability, is a more accessible variable that can apply to many other situations.  
One limitation of this paper is that the exclusion restriction variable, the annual 
income of the most recent job of the entrepreneur, is a weak instrument. Thus, the selection 
step of the Heckman model used in this paper had limited power of estimation. Therefore, 
the LBD effect (the main effect of the Heckman model) was an upper bound of the real 
LBD effect while the self-selection effect was a lower bound. Future research could use 
stronger instruments to improve the accuracy of estimation of the Heckman selection 
model.  
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